Equivalent Choice Functions and Stable Mechanisms
Theoretical Economics
2021-07-13 v3
Abstract
We study conditions for the existence of stable and group-strategy-proof mechanisms in a many-to-one matching model with contracts if students' preferences are monotone in contract terms. We show that "equivalence", properly defined, to a choice profile under which contracts are substitutes and the law of aggregate holds is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a stable and group-strategy-proof mechanism. Our result can be interpreted as a (weak) embedding result for choice functions under which contracts are observable substitutes and the observable law of aggregate demand holds.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1812.10326,
title = {Equivalent Choice Functions and Stable Mechanisms},
author = {Jan Christoph Schlegel},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1812.10326},
year = {2021}
}