Stable Outcomes For Contract Choice Problems
Optimization and Control
2007-05-23 v1 Combinatorics
Abstract
In this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of contracts to choose from. We call such problems, contract choice problems. We provide conditions under which a contract choice problem has a non-empty set of "stable" outcomes. There are two types of stability concepts we study in this paper: cooperative stability and non-cooperative stability. The cooperative stability concept that we invoke here is the core. The non-cooperative stability concept that we study here is individual stability. The final result of this paper states that every contract choice problem has a non-empty weak bargaining set.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.math/0401199,
title = {Stable Outcomes For Contract Choice Problems},
author = {Somdeb Lahiri},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:math/0401199},
year = {2007}
}
Comments
14 pages