Unidirectional substitutes and complements
Theoretical Economics
2021-08-31 v1
Abstract
In discrete matching markets, substitutes and complements can be unidirectional between two groups of workers when members of one group are more important or competent than those of the other group for firms. We show that a stable matching exists and can be found by a two-stage Deferred Acceptance mechanism when firms' preferences satisfy a unidirectional substitutes and complements condition. This result applies to both firm-worker matching and controlled school choice. Under the framework of matching with continuous monetary transfers and quasi-linear utilities, we show that substitutes and complements are bidirectional for a pair of workers.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2108.12572,
title = {Unidirectional substitutes and complements},
author = {Chao Huang},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2108.12572},
year = {2021}
}