相关论文: Strategy-proofness on the Non-Paretian Subdomain
We analyse strategic, complete information, sequential voting with ordinal preferences over the alternatives. We consider several voting mechanisms: plurality voting and approval voting with deterministic or uniform tie-breaking rules. We…
For a graph G, a signed domination function of G is a two-colouring of the vertices of G with colours +1 and -1 such that the closed neighbourhood of every vertex contains more +1's than -1's. This concept is closely related to…
We present partial strategyproofness, a new, relaxed notion of strategyproofness for studying the incentive properties of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms. Informally, a mechanism is partially strategyproof if it makes truthful…
In a graph $G$, a vertex dominates itself and its neighbors. A subset $S\subseteq V(G)$ is said to be a double dominating set of $G$ if $S$ dominates every vertex of $G$ at least twice. The double domination number $\gamma_{\times 2}(G)$ is…
Admissible strategies, i.e. those that are not dominated by any other strategy, are a typical rationality notion in game theory. In many classes of games this is justified by results showing that any strategy is admissible or dominated by…
Maximum likelihood estimation furnishes powerful insights into voting theory, and the design of voting rules. However the MLE can usually be badly corrupted by a single outlying sample. This means that a single voter or a group of colluding…
A set $S$ of vertices in a graph $G$ is a dominating set if every vertex of $G$ is in $S$ or is adjacent to a vertex in $S$. If, in addition, $S$ is an independent set, then $S$ is an independent dominating set. The domination number…
We study a general aggregation problem in which a society has to determine its position on each of several issues, based on the positions of the members of the society on those issues. There is a prescribed set of feasible evaluations,…
In this paper, we study a parameter that is a relaxation of arguably the most important domination parameter, namely the domination number. Given the sheer scale of modern networks, many existing domination type structures are expensive to…
We consider the verification of multiple expected reward objectives at once on Markov decision processes (MDPs). This enables a trade-off analysis among multiple objectives by obtaining the Pareto front. We focus on strategies that are easy…
Let G be a simple undirected graph with no isolated vertex. A paired dominating set of G is a dominating set which induces a subgraph that has a perfect matching. The paired domination number of G, denoted by {\gamma}pr(G), is the size of…
In many-to-many matching models, substitutable preferences constitute the largest domain for which a pairwise stable matching is guaranteed to exist. In this note, we extend the recently proposed algorithm of Hatfield et al. [3] to test…
The concept of generalized domination unifies well-known variants of domination-like and independence problems, such as Dominating Set, Independent Set, Perfect Code, etc. A generalized domination (also called $[\sigma,\rho]$-Dominating…
For a graph $G=(V,E)$, a set $S\subseteq V$ is a dominating set if every vertex in $V-S$ has at least a neighbor in $S$. A dominating set $S$ is a global offensive alliance if for each vertex $v$ in $V-S$ at least half the vertices from the…
We revisit the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for allocating divisible items among two agents who have linear utilities, where payments are disallowed and there is no prior information on the agents' preferences. The…
In this short paper, we establish relations between the domination number $\gamma$, the total domination number $\gamma_t$, and the connected domination number $\gamma_c$ of a graph. In particular, we prove upper and lower bounds for…
Let X be a finite set of alternatives. A choice function c is a mapping which assigns to nonempty subsets S of X an element c(S) of S. A rational choice function is one for which there is a linear ordering on the alternatives such that c(S)…
We study a sequence of independent one-shot non-cooperative games where agents play equilibria determined by a tunable mechanism. Observing only equilibrium decisions, without parametric or distributional knowledge of utilities, we aim to…
Given a graph $G = (V, E)$, a non-empty set $S \subseteq V$ is a defensive alliance, if for every vertex $v \in S$, the majority of its closed neighbours are in $S$, that is, $|N_G[v] \cap S| \geq |N_G[v] \setminus S|$. The decision version…
For $S\subseteq V(G)$, we define $\bar{S}=V(G)\setminus S$. A set $S\subseteq V(G)$ is called a super dominating set if for every vertex $u\in \bar{S}$, there exists $v\in S$ such that $N(v)\cap \bar{S}=\{u\}$. The super domination number…