相关论文: Knightian Robustness of Single-Parameter Domains

We study the evolutionary robustness of strategies in infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games in which players make mistakes with a small probability and are patient. The evolutionary process we consider is given by the replicator…

We consider two classes of constrained finite state-action stochastic games. First, we consider a two player nonzero sum single controller constrained stochastic game with both average and discounted cost criterion. We consider the same…

A robust game is a distribution-free model to handle ambiguity generated by a bounded set of possible realizations of the values of players' payoff functions. The players are worst-case optimizers and a solution, called robust-optimization…

We investigate the transient and steady-state dynamics of the Bennati-Dragulescu-Yakovenko money game in the presence of probabilistic cheaters, who can misrepresent their financial status by claiming to have no money. We derive the…

Using the supersymmetry approach, we study spectral statistical properties of a two-dimensional quantum particle subject to a non-uniform magnetic field. We focus mainly on the problem of regularisation of the field theory. Our analysis…

We study the problem of prediction with expert advice with adversarial corruption where the adversary can at most corrupt one expert. Using tools from viscosity theory, we characterize the long-time behavior of the value function of the…

In this paper, we present a framework for multi-agent learning in a nonstationary dynamic network environment. More specifically, we examine projected gradient play in smooth monotone repeated network games in which the agents'…

The preference graph is a combinatorial representation of the structure of a normal-form game. Its nodes are the strategy profiles, with an arc between profiles if they differ in the strategy of a single player, where the orientation…

Recently, in [K.R. Apt and S. Simon: Well-founded extensive games with perfect information, TARK21], we studied well-founded games, a natural extension of finite extensive games with perfect information in which all plays are finite. We…

In this paper, we perform a minimalistic quantization of the classical game of tic-tac-toe, by allowing superpositions of classical moves. In order for the quantum game to reduce properly to the classical game, we require legal quantum…

We develop an abstract axiomatic theory of tie-breaking. A tie-breaking input consists of a finite set N of players, a weak order on N representing the standings to be refined, and an auxiliary information item drawn from a set on which the…

We study learning dynamics induced by strategic agents who repeatedly play a game with an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In each step, an information system estimates a belief distribution of the parameter based on the players'…

In this paper, we propose a probabilistic game-theoretic model to study the properties of the worst-case regret of the greedy strategy under complete (Knightian) uncertainty. In a game between a decision-maker (DM) and an adversarial agent…

Game theory relies heavily on the availability of cardinal utility functions, but in fields such as matching markets, only ordinal preferences are typically elicited. The literature focuses on mechanisms with simple dominant strategies, but…

We consider the prisoner's dilemma being played repeatedly on a dynamic network, where agents may choose their actions as well as their co-players. This leads to co-evolution of network structure and strategy patterns of the players.…

A tournament is said to have the $S_k$-property if, for any set of $k$ players, there is another player who beats them all. Minimum tournaments having this property have been explored very well in the 1960's and the early 1970's. In this…

We investigate the survivor distributions of a spatially extended model of competitive dynamics in different geometries. The model consists of a deterministic dynamical system of individual agents at specified nodes, which might or might…

Under the assumption of complete rationality, Nash equilibrium is the only reasonable strategy (set) of the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. In fact, some strategies only slightly deviate from the so-called rationality, and the…

Through a stochastic control theoretic approach, we analyze reputation games where a strategic long-lived player acts in a sequential repeated game against a collection of short-lived players. The key assumption in our model is that the…

Self-stabilization is a strong property that guarantees that a network always resume correct behavior starting from an arbitrary initial state. Weaker guarantees have later been introduced to cope with impossibility results: probabilistic…