相关论文: A Solution to Bargaining Problem on Divisible Good…

We consider the problem of repeatedly allocating multiple shareable public goods that have limited availability in an online setting without the use of money. In our setting, agents have additive values, and the value each agent receives…

We study a game with \emph{strategic} vendors who own multiple items and a single buyer with a submodular valuation function. The goal of the vendors is to maximize their revenue via pricing of the items, given that the buyer will buy the…

We study a version of the classical Cayley-Moser optimal stopping problem, in which a seller must sell an asset by a given deadline, with the offers, which are independent random variables with a known distribution, arriving at random…

We initiate the study of how to perturb the reward in a zero-sum Markov game with two players to induce a desirable Nash equilibrium, namely arbitrating. Such a problem admits a bi-level optimization formulation. The lower level requires…

Nash equilibrium serves as a fundamental mathematical tool in economics and game theory. However, it classically assumes knowledge of player utilities, whereas economics generally regards preferences as more fundamental. To leverage…

In this work, we revisit the problem of fairly allocating a number of indivisible items that are located on a line to multiple agents. A feasible allocation requires that the allocated items to each agent are connected on the line. The…

We consider the $\varepsilon$-Consensus-Halving problem, in which a set of heterogeneous agents aim at dividing a continuous resource into two (not necessarily contiguous) portions that all of them simultaneously consider to be of…

In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and…

We introduce a method based on the Public Goods Game for solving optimization tasks. In particular, we focus on the Traveling Salesman Problem, i.e. a NP-hard problem whose search space exponentially grows increasing the number of cities.…

We study a repeated trading problem in which a mechanism designer facilitates trade between a single seller and multiple buyers. Our model generalizes the classic bilateral trade setting to a multi-buyer environment. Specifically, the…

Many-to-many matching with contracts is studied in the framework of revealed preferences. All preferences are described by choice functions that satisfy natural conditions. Under a no-externality assumption individual preferences can be…

We discuss final-offer arbitration where two quantitative issues are in dispute and model it as a zero-sum game. Under reasonable assumptions we both derive a pure strategy pair and show that it is both a local equilibrium and furthermore…

We consider the fair allocation of indivisible items to several agents with additional conflict constraints. These are represented by a conflict graph where each item corresponds to a vertex of the graph and edges in the graph represent…

We study an online version of the max-min fair allocation problem for indivisible items. In this problem, items arrive one by one, and each item must be allocated irrevocably on arrival to one of $n$ agents, who have additive valuations for…

In Multi-task learning (MTL), a joint model is trained to simultaneously make predictions for several tasks. Joint training reduces computation costs and improves data efficiency; however, since the gradients of these different tasks may…

One of the problems faced by a firm that sells certain commodities is to determine the number of products that it must supply in order to maximize its profit. In this article, the authors give an answer to this problem of economic interest.…

We consider a partially asymmetric three-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables. Two players (A and B) have the same payoff functions, and Player C does not. Two strategic variables are $t_i$'s and $s_i$'s for $i=A, B, C$.…

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods between groups of agents using the recently introduced relaxations of envy-freeness. We consider the existence of fair allocations under different assumptions on the valuations of…

This paper deals with an extension of the concept of correlated strategies to Markov stopping games. The Nash equilibrium approach to solving nonzero-sum stopping games may give multiple solutions. An arbitrator can suggest to each player…

We compare the Egalitarian Equivalent and the Competitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes rules to divide a bundle of goods (heirlooms) or a bundle of bads (chores). For goods the Competitive division fares better, as it is Resource…