相关论文: Truthful approximations to range voting

Since the 1990s spectrum auctions have been implemented world-wide. This has provided for a practical examination of an assortment of auction mechanisms and, amongst these, two simultaneous ascending price auctions have proved to be…

An important research thread in algorithmic game theory studies the design of efficient truthful mechanisms that approximate the optimal social welfare. A fundamental question is whether an \alpha-approximation algorithm translates into an…

Many auction settings implicitly or explicitly require that bidders are treated equally ex-ante. This may be because discrimination is philosophically or legally impermissible, or because it is practically difficult to implement or…

We study Matching and other related problems in a partial information setting where the agents' utilities for being matched to other agents are hidden and the mechanism only has access to ordinal preference information. Our model is…

How does one allocate a collection of resources to a set of strategic agents in a fair and efficient manner without using money? For in many scenarios it is not feasible to use money to compensate agents for otherwise unsatisfactory…

The notion of \emph{envy-freeness} is a natural and intuitive fairness requirement in resource allocation. With indivisible goods, such fair allocations are unfortunately not guaranteed to exist. Classical works have avoided this issue by…

Recent work has constructed economic mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private. In these mechanisms, privacy is treated separately from the truthfulness; it is not incorporated in players' utility functions (and doing so…

We consider the problem of repeatedly choosing policies to maximize social welfare. Welfare is a weighted sum of private utility and public revenue. Earlier outcomes inform later policies. Utility is not observed, but indirectly inferred.…

This paper considers prior-independent mechanism design, in which a single mechanism is designed to achieve approximately optimal performance on every prior distribution from a given class. Most results in this literature focus on…

We continue the study of welfare maximization in unit-demand (matching) markets, in a distributed information model where agent's valuations are unknown to the central planner, and therefore communication is required to determine an…

Combinatorial auctions (CA) are a well-studied area in algorithmic mechanism design. However, contrary to the standard model, empirical studies suggest that a bidder's valuation often does not depend solely on the goods assigned to him. For…

Motivated by applications such as college admission and insurance rate determination, we propose an evaluation problem where the inputs are controlled by strategic individuals who can modify their features at a cost. A learner can only…

We study the utilitarian distortion of social choice mechanisms under the recently proposed learning-augmented framework where some (possibly unreliable) predicted information about the preferences of the agents is given as input. In…

We give the first $O(1)$-approximation for the weighted Nash Social Welfare problem with additive valuations. The approximation ratio we obtain is $e^{1/e} + \epsilon \approx 1.445 + \epsilon$, which matches the best known approximation…

For the classical maximum coverage problem, the greedy algorithm achieves a worst-case $1-1/e$ approximation, which is optimal unless $\text{P} = \text{NP}$. The notion of coverage appears in a wide range of optimization tasks, where…

Research on promoting cooperation among autonomous, self-regarding agents has often focused on the bi-objective optimisation problem: minimising the total incentive cost while maximising the frequency of cooperation. However, the optimal…

We consider the minimum makespan problem for $n$ tasks and two unrelated parallel selfish machines. Let $R_n$ be the best approximation ratio of randomized monotone scale-free algorithms. This class contains the most efficient algorithms…

We study the power of polynomial-time truthful mechanisms comparing to polynomial time (non-truthful) algorithms. We show that there is a setting in which deterministic polynomial-time truthful mechanisms cannot guarantee a bounded…

We initiate the work on fair and strategyproof allocation of indivisible chores. The fairness concept we consider in this paper is maxmin share (MMS) fairness. We consider three previously studied models of information elicited from the…

For the fundamental problem of allocating a set of resources among individuals with varied preferences, the quality of an allocation relates to the degree of fairness and the collective welfare achieved. Unfortunately, in many…