相关论文: Cyclic motions in Dekel-Scotchmer Game Experiments

We study the oscillatory dynamics in the generic three-species rock-paper-scissors games with mutations. In the mean-field limit, different behaviors are found: (a) for high mutation rate, there is a stable interior fixed point with…

We extend the formalism of Conjectural Variations games to Stackelberg games involving multiple leaders and a single follower. To solve these nonconvex games, a common assumption is that the leaders compute their strategies having perfect…

Leveraging tools from the study of linear fractional transformations and algebraic Riccati equations, a local characterization of consistent conjectural variations equilibrium is given for two player games on continuous action spaces with…

In game theory, the concept of Nash equilibrium reflects the collective stability of some individual strategies chosen by selfish agents. The concept pertains to different classes of games, e.g. the sequential games, where the agents play…

Characterizing the limit behavior -- that is, the attractors -- of learning dynamics is one of the most fundamental open questions in game theory. In recent work on this front, it was conjectured that the attractors of the replicator…

Mating preferences of many biological species are not constant but season-dependent. Within the framework of evolutionary game theory this can be modeled with two finite opposite-sex populations playing against each other following the…

Non-equilibrium steady states (NESS) of Markov processes give rise to non-trivial cyclic probability fluxes. Cycle decompositions of the steady state offer an effective description of such fluxes. Here, we present an iterative cycle…

The study of animal movement is challenging because it is a process modulated by many factors acting at different spatial and temporal scales. Several models have been proposed which differ primarily in the temporal conceptualization,…

This paper introduces two fundamentally new concepts to game theory: multilateral Nash equilibria and families of games. Starting with non-cooperative games, we show how these notions together seamlessly integrate into and naturally extend…

Mean field games are studied in the framework of controlled martingale problems, and general existence theorems are proven in which the equilibrium control is Markovian. The framework is flexible enough to include degenerate volatility,…

Imitation dynamics for population games are studied and their asymptotic properties analyzed. In the considered class of imitation dynamics - that encompass the replicator equation as well as other models previously considered in…

Population games can be regarded as a tool to study the strategic interaction of a population of players. Although several attention has been given to such field, most of the available works have focused only on the unconstrained case. That…

We study continuous stochastic games with heterogeneous mean field interactions and jumps on large networks and explore their limit counterparts. We introduce the graphon game model based on a controlled graphon mean field stochastic…

We study the stochastic dynamics of evolutionary games, and focus on the so-called `stochastic slowdown' effect, previously observed in (Altrock et. al, 2010) for simple evolutionary dynamics. Slowdown here refers to the fact that a…

This work contains the mathematical exploration of a few prototypical games in which central concepts from statistics and probability theory naturally emerge. The first two kinds of games are termed Fisher and Bayesian games, which are…

In multi-agent autonomous systems, deception is a fundamental concept which characterizes the exploitation of unbalanced information to mislead victims into choosing oblivious actions. This effectively alters the system's long term…

When people play a repeated game they usually try to anticipate their opponents' moves based on past observations, and then decide what action to take next. Behavioural economics studies the mechanisms by which strategic decisions are taken…

During 2023, two interesting results were proven about the limit behavior of game dynamics: First, it was shown that there is a game for which no dynamics converges to the Nash equilibria. Second, it was shown that the sink equilibria of a…

Recently, a new model extending the standard replicator equation to a finite set of players connected on an arbitrary graph was developed in evolutionary game dynamics. The players are interpreted as subpopulations of multipopulations…

We consider a distributed stochastic approximation (SA) scheme for computing an equilibrium of a stochastic Nash game. Standard SA schemes employ diminishing steplength sequences that are square summable but not summable. Such requirements…