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Public-Private Partnership (PPP) is a contract between a public entity and a consortium, in which the public outsources the construction and the maintenance of an equipment (hospital, university, prison...). One drawback of this contract is…

This paper studies contracting in the presence of externalities with a non-contractible outsider. Multiple equilibria arise from strategic symmetry between the insider agent and the outsider. To address strategic uncertainty, the principal…

We study a market of investments on networks, where each agent (vertex) can invest in any enterprise linked to her, and at the same time, raise capital for her firm's enterprise from other agents she is linked to. Failing to raise…

Software startups are becoming increasingly popular in software industry as well as other sectors of economy. Startups that lack necessary competences often seek for external resources from outsourcing partners. Little is known how this…

We construct Nash equilibria in feedback form for a class of two-person stochastic games of singular control with absorption, arising from a stylized model for corporate finance. More precisely, the paper focusses on a strategic dynamic…

To grow their businesses, entrepreneurs often rely on equity funding. This paper focuses on two elements of entrepreneur-investor equity negotiations: the number of potential investors and the contractual complexity surrounding investor…

The paper provides an algorithm for the risk estimation when a company selects an outsourcing service provider for innovation product. Calculations are based on expert surveys conducted among customers and among providers of outsourcing.…

We study the optimal investment-reinsurance problem in the context of equity-linked insurance products. Such products often have a capital guarantee, which can motivate insurers to purchase reinsurance. Since a reinsurance contract implies…

Interconnected agents such as firms in a supply chain make simultaneous preparatory investments to increase chances of honouring their respective bilateral agreements. Failures cascade: if one fails their agreement, then so do all who…

We consider a model of debt management, where a sovereign state trade some bonds to service the debt with a pool of risk-neutral competitive foreign investors. At each time, the government decides which fraction of the gross domestic…

Many organizations have access to abundant data but lack the computational power to process the data. While they can outsource the computational task to other facilities, there are various constraints on the amount of data that can be…

We derive the optimal investment decision in a project where both demand and investment costs are stochastic processes, eventually subject to shocks. We extend the approach used in Dixit and Pindyck (1994), chapter 6.5, to deal with two…

IT security outsourcing is the process of contracting a third-party security service provider to perform, the full or partial IT security functions of an organization. Little is known about the factors influencing organizational decisions…

This paper studies a duopoly investment model with uncertainty. There are two alternative irreversible investments. The first firm to invest gets a monopoly benefit for a specified period of time. The second firm to invest gets information…

The timing of strategic exit is one of the most important but difficult business decisions, especially under competition and uncertainty. Motivated by this problem, we examine a stochastic game of exit in which players are uncertain about…

A problem of optimal debt management is modeled as a noncooperative game between a borrower and a pool of lenders, in infinite time horizon with exponential discount. The yearly income of the borrower is governed by a stochastic process.…

Consider a dynamic decision-making scenario where at every stage the investor has to choose between investing in one of two projects or gathering more information. At each stage, the investor may seek counsel from one of several…

In a framework close to the one developed by Holmstr\"om and Milgrom [44], we study the optimal contracting scheme between a Principal and several Agents. Each hired Agent is in charge of one project, and can make efforts towards managing…

We study an optimal investment problem under default risk where related information such as loss or recovery at default is considered as an exogenous random mark added at default time. Two types of agents who have different levels of…

General partners (GP) are sometimes paid on a deal-by-deal basis and other times on a whole-portfolio basis. When is one method of payment better than the other? I show that when assets (projects or firms) are highly correlated or when GPs…