相关论文: Ascending auctions and Walrasian equilibrium

We described a method to solve deterministic and stochastic Walras equilibrium models based on associating with the given problem a bifunction whose maxinf-points turn out to be equilibrium points. The numerical procedure relies on an…

We characterize single-item auction formats that are shill-proof in the sense that a profit-maximizing seller has no incentive to submit shill bids. We distinguish between strong shill-proofness, in which a seller with full knowledge of…

Under the incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, coalitions of participants can influence the auction outcome to obtain higher collective profit. These manipulations were proven to be eliminated if and only if the market…

We study competitive equilibrium in the canonical Fisher market model, but with indivisible goods. In this model, every agent has a budget of artificial currency with which to purchase bundles of goods. Equilibrium prices match between…

We propose a conjectural characterization of when the dynamical Galois group associated to a polynomial is abelian, and we prove our conjecture in several cases, including the stable quadratic case over ${\mathbb Q}$. In the postcritically…

. We study the evolution of the distribution of eigenvalues of a $N\times N$ matrix subject to a random perturbation drawn from (i) a generalized Gaussian ensemble (ii) a non-Gaussian ensemble with a measure variable under the change of…

We consider the classical linear assignment problem, and we introduce new auction algorithms for its optimal and suboptimal solution. The algorithms are founded on duality theory, and are related to ideas of competitive bidding by persons…

It has become the default in markets such as ad auctions for participants to bid in an auction through automated bidding agents (autobidders) which adjust bids over time to satisfy return-over-spend constraints. Despite the prominence of…

In this paper, we extend properties Going Up and Lying Over from ring theory to the general setting of congruence--modular equational classes, using the notion of prime congruence defined through the commutator. We show how these two…

The aim of this expository note is to prove that any $1$-subgaussian random vector is dominated in the convex ordering by a universal constant times a standard Gaussian vector. This strengthens Talagrand's celebrated subgaussian comparison…

The literature on the Price of Anarchy (PoA) of simple auctions employs a no-overbidding assumption but has completely overlooked the no-underbidding phenomenon, which is evident in empirical studies on variants of the second price auction.…

Building on the linear programming approach to competitive equilibrium pricing, we develop a general method for constructing iterative auctions that achieve Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) outcomes. We show how to transform a linear program…

We prove that the $abc$-Conjecture implies upper bounds on Zsigmondy sets that are uniform over families of unicritical polynomials over number fields. As an application, we use the $abc$-Conjecture to prove that there exist uniform bounds…

In the article we establish the global well-posedness in W^{1,(6,2)}(R \times R+) of the integro-differential equation containing the cube of the one dimensional Laplacian and the transport term. Our proof relies on a fixed point technique.…

The paper presents an evolutionary economic model for the price evolution of stocks. Treating a stock market as a self-organized system governed by a fast purchase process and slow variations of demand and supply the model suggests that the…

The paper is devoted to dynamic games. We consider a general enough framework, which is not limited to e.g. differential games and could accommodate both discrete and continuous time. Assuming common dynamics, we study two game families…

In economics, there are many ways to describe the interaction between a "seller" and a "buyer". The most common one, with which we interact almost every day, is selling for a fixed price. This option is perfect for selling a mass product,…

It is attempted to construct a group-dependent quantity that could be used to single out the Standard Model group S(U(2) x U(3)) as being the "winner" by this quantity being the biggest possible for just the Standard Model group. The…

A class of discrete Bidding Combinatorial Games that generalize alternating normal play was introduced by Kant, Larsson, Rai, and Upasany (2022). The major questions concerning optimal outcomes were resolved. By generalizing standard game…

We propose a new methodology to compute equilibria for general equilibrium problems on exchange economies with real financial markets, home-production, and retention. We demonstrate that equilibrium prices can be determined by solving a…