相关论文: Ascending auctions and Walrasian equilibrium

The popular generalized second price (GSP) auction for sponsored search is built upon a separable model of click-through-rates that decomposes the likelihood of a click into the product of a "slot effect" and an "advertiser effect" --- if…

We revisit the connection between bargaining and equilibrium in exchange economies, and study its algorithmic implications. We consider bargaining outcomes to be allocations that cannot be blocked (i.e., profitably re-traded) by coalitions…

We study Demazure modules which occur in a level $\ell$ irreducible integrable representation of an affine Lie algebra. We also assume that they are stable under the action of the standard maximal parabolic subalgebra of the affine Lie…

We consider an Einstein-Scalar-Gauss-Bonnet gravitational theory, and argue that at early times the Ricci scalar can be safely ignored. We then demonstrate that the pure scalar-Gauss-Bonnet theory, with a quadratic coupling function,…

Proportional response is a well-established distributed algorithm which has been shown to converge to competitive equilibria in both Fisher and Arrow-Debreu markets, for various sub-families of homogeneous utilities, including linear and…

Given a strict partial order $\Delta$ on a set $\Lambda$ and an arbitrary ring $R$ with $1\neq 0$, the corresponding McLain group $M(\Delta)$ has been studied in depth. We construct a larger family of McLain groups $G(\Delta)$, where…

We show that functorial equivalences can offer new insight into the blockwise Galois Alperin weight conjecture (BGAWC). Inspired by Kn\"orr and Robinson's work, we first formulate the BGAWC in terms of alternating sums indexed by chains of…

This note pursues two primary objectives. First, we analyze the outcomes of an all-pay auction within a store where buyers with and without financial constraints arrive at varying rates, and where buyer types are private information.…

We propose a new all-pay auction format in which risk-loving bidders pay a constant fee each time they bid for an object whose monetary value is common knowledge among the bidders, and bidding fees are the only source of benefit for the…

We study sequential procurement auctions where the sellers are provided with a ``best and final offer'' (BAFO) strategy. This strategy allows each seller $i$ to effectively ``freeze'' their price while remaining active in the auction, and…

Nearly fifteen years ago, Google unveiled the generalized second price (GSP) auction. By all theoretical accounts including their own [Varian 14], this was the wrong auction --- the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction would have been the…

Walrasian equilibrium prices can be said to coordinate markets: They support a welfare optimal allocation in which each buyer is buying bundle of goods that is individually most preferred. However, this clean story has two caveats. First,…

We study a combinatorial market design problem, where a collection of indivisible objects is to be priced and sold to potential buyers subject to equilibrium constraints.The classic solution concept for such problems is Walrasian…

We first investigate the evolution of opening and closing auctions volumes of US equities along the years. We then report dynamical properties of pre-auction periods: the indicative match price is strongly mean-reverting because the…

In this paper, we prove the existence of certain lifts of Hilbert cusp forms to general odd spin groups. We then use those lifts to provide evidence for a conjecture of Gross on the modularity of abelian varieties not of ${\rm GL}_2$-type.

The notion that economies should normally be in equilibrium is by now well-established; equally well-established is that economies are almost never precisely in equilibrium. Using a very general formulation, we show that under dynamics that…

Motivated by sponsored search auctions, we study multi-unit auctions with budget constraints. In the mechanism we propose, Sort-Cut, understating budgets or values is weakly dominated. Since Sort-Cut's revenue is increasing in budgets and…

Let $W$ be a $G$-graded algebra over a field of characteristic zero, where $G$ is a finite group. We develope a theory of generalized $G$-graded polynomial identities satisfied by any finite-dimensional $W$-algebra $A$, by mean of the…

We introduce a class of Bayesian bidding games for which we prove that the set of pure Nash equilibria is a (non-empty) sublattice and we give a sufficient condition for uniqueness that is often verified in the context of markets with…

While auction theory views bids and valuations as continuous variables, real-world auctions are necessarily discrete. In this paper, we use a combination of analytical and computational methods to investigate whether incorporating…