相关论文: Ascending auctions and Walrasian equilibrium

Designing an incentive-compatible auction mechanism that maximizes the auctioneer's revenue while minimizes the bidders' ex-post regret is an important yet intricate problem in economics. Remarkable progress has been achieved through…

Let $G$ be a multiplicative subsemigroup of the general linear group $\Gl(\mathbb{R}^d)$ which consists of matrices with positive entries such that every column and every row contains a strictly positive element. Given a $G$--valued random…

We are interested in mechanisms that maximize social welfare. In [1] this problem was studied for multi-unit auctions with unit demand bidders and for the public project problem, and in each case social welfare undominated mechanisms in the…

We study combinatorial auctions with interdependent valuations. In such settings, each agent $i$ has a private signal $s_i$ that captures her private information, and the valuation function of every agent depends on the entire signal…

A single advertisement often benefits many parties, for example, an ad for a Samsung laptop benefits Microsoft. We study this phenomenon in search advertising auctions and show that standard solutions, including the status quo ignorance of…

We consider a bipartite network of buyers and sellers, where the sellers run locally independent Progressive Second-Price (PSP) auctions, and buyers may participate in multiple auctions, forming a multi-auction market with perfect…

Let G be a finite subgroup of GL_n(C). A study is made of the ways in which resolutions of the quotient space C^n / G can parametrise G-constellations, that is, G-regular finite length sheaves. These generalise G-clusters, which are used in…

Budget constraints are ubiquitous in online advertisement auctions. To manage these constraints and smooth out the expenditure across auctions, the bidders (or the platform on behalf of them) often employ pacing: each bidder is assigned a…

The paper contains at the end a proof of the conjecture of Gross - Kuz'min, for CM extensions of Q. The main topic of the paper is the investigation of the growth of order and ranks at finite levels of some Lambda modules (p-parts of ideal…

We study a seller who sells a single good to multiple bidders with uncertainty over the joint distribution of bidders' valuations, as well as bidders' higher-order beliefs about their opponents. The seller only knows the (possibly…

We study a novel class of mechanism design problems in which the outcomes are constrained by the payments. This basic class of mechanism design problems captures many common economic situations, and yet it has not been studied, to our…

By using only combinatorial data on two posets X and Y, we construct a set of so-called formulas. A formula produces simultaneously, for any abelian category A, a functor between the categories of complexes of diagrams over X and Y with…

In Bayesian single-item auctions, a monotone bidding strategy--one that prescribes a higher bid for a higher value type--can be equivalently represented as a partition of the quantile space into consecutive intervals corresponding to…

We consider the family of real (generalized) eigenfunctions of the adjacency operator on $T_d$ - the $d$-regular tree. We show the existence of a unique invariant Gaussian process on the ensemble and derive explicitly its covariance…

We introduce a family of rank functions and related notions of total transcendence for Galois types in abstract elementary classes. We focus, in particular, on abstract elementary classes satisfying the condition know as tameness (currently…

We study the fluctuations of eigenvalues from a class of Wigner random matrices that generalize the Gaussian orthogonal ensemble. We begin by considering an $n \times n$ matrix from the Gaussian orthogonal ensemble (GOE) or Gaussian…

We study a class of manipulations in combinatorial auctions where bidders fundamentally misrepresent what goods they are interested in. Prior work has largely assumed that bidders only submit bids on their bundles of interest, which we call…

Using duality theory techniques we derive simple, closed-form formulas for bounding the optimal revenue of a monopolist selling many heterogeneous goods, in the case where the buyer's valuations for the items come i.i.d. from a uniform…

This is both an expository and research paper where we advocate a systematic study of continuous analogues of finite partially ordered sets, convex polytopes, oriented matroids, arrangements of subspaces, finite simplicial complexes, and…

In an all-pay auction, only one bidder wins but all bidders must pay the auctioneer. All-pay bidding games arise from attaching a similar bidding structure to traditional combinatorial games to determine which player moves next. In contrast…