相关论文: Allocation of Divisible Goods under Lexicographic …

We provide an axiomatic characterization of lexicographic preferences over the set of all random availability functions using two assumptions. The first assumption is strong monotonicity, which in our framework is equivalent to the strong…

We consider a scheduling problem of strategic agents representing jobs of different weights. Each agent has to decide on one of a finite set of identical machines to get their job processed. In contrast to the common and exclusive focus on…

We consider allocating indivisible goods with provable fairness guarantees that are satisfied regardless of which bundle of items each agent receives. Symmetrical allocations of this type are known to exist for divisible resources, such as…

We study fair division of indivisible goods in a single-parameter environment. In particular, we develop truthful social welfare maximizing mechanisms for fairly allocating indivisible goods. Our fairness guarantees are in terms of solution…

We consider a setting in which a group of agents share resources that must be allocated among them in each discrete time period. Agents have time-varying demands and derive constant marginal utility from each unit of resource received up to…

When dividing items among agents, two of the most widely studied fairness notions are envy-freeness and proportionality. We consider a setting where $m$ chores are allocated to $n$ agents and the disutility of each chore for each agent is…

We introduce and analyze new envy-based fairness concepts for agents with weights that quantify their entitlements in the allocation of indivisible items. We propose two variants of weighted envy-freeness up to one item (WEF1): strong,…

In standard fair division models, we assume that all agents are selfish. However, in many scenarios, division of resources has a direct impact on the whole group or even society. Therefore, we study fair allocations of indivisible items…

We study mechanism which operate on ordinal preference information (i.e., rank ordered lists of alternatives) on the full domain of weak preferences that admits indifferences. We present a novel decomposition of strategyproofness into three…

We consider the task of allocating indivisible items to agents, when the agents' preferences over the items are identical. The preferences are captured by means of a directed acyclic graph, with vertices representing items and an edge…

We study fair division of goods under the broad class of generalized assignment constraints. In this constraint framework, the sizes and values of the goods are agent-specific, and one needs to allocate the goods among the agents fairly…

We consider house allocation with existing tenants in which each agent has dichotomous preferences. We present strategyproof, polynomial-time, and (strongly) individually rational algorithms that satisfy the maximum number of agents. For…

We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible chores under additive valuations. We assume that the chores are divided into two types and under this scenario, we present several results. Our first result is a new characterization…

An indivisible object may be sold to one of $n$ agents who know their valuations of the object. The seller would like to use a revenue-maximizing mechanism but her knowledge of the valuations' distribution is scarce: she knows only the…

We study the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating indivisible chores among agents with additive disutility functions. We consider the widely-used envy-based fairness properties of EF1 and EFX, in conjunction with the efficiency…

Finding an envy-free allocation of indivisible resources to agents is a central task in many multiagent systems. Often, non-trivial envy-free allocations do not exist, and, when they do, finding them can be computationally hard. Classical…

We study the problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous resource, commonly known as cake cutting and chore division, in the presence of strategic agents. While a number of results in this setting have been established in previous works,…

Motivated by the increasing interest in the explicit representation and handling of various "preference" structures arising in modern digital economy, this work introduces a new class of "one-to-many stable-matching" problems where a set of…

We study the problem of fair and efficient allocation of a set of indivisible chores to agents with additive cost functions. We consider the popular fairness notion of envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) with the efficiency notion of…

In the fair division of items among interested agents, envy-freeness is possibly the most favoured and widely studied formalisation of fairness. For indivisible items, envy-free allocations may not exist in trivial cases, and hence research…