相关论文: Bounded-Distance Network Creation Games

We study network formation with n players and link cost \alpha > 0. After the network is built, an adversary randomly deletes one link according to a certain probability distribution. Cost for player v incorporates the expected number of…

A central question in algorithmic game theory is to measure the inefficiency (ratio of costs) of Nash equilibria (NE) with respect to socially optimal solutions. The two established metrics used for this purpose are price of anarchy (POA)…

Many real-world networks, like the Internet, are not the result of central design but instead the outcome of the interaction of local agents who are selfishly optimizing for their individual utility. The famous Network Creation Game…

Two important metrics for measuring the quality of routing paths are the maximum edge congestion $C$ and maximum path length $D$. Here, we study bicriteria in routing games where each player $i$ selfishly selects a path that simultaneously…

We model the formation of networks as a game where players aspire to maximize their own centrality by increasing the number of other players to which they are path-wise connected, while simultaneously incurring a cost for each added…

This paper investigates design of noncooperative games from an optimization and control theoretic perspective. Pricing mechanisms are used as a design tool to ensure that the Nash equilibrium of a fairly general class of noncooperative…

We consider non-cooperative unsplittable congestion games where players share resources, and each player's strategy is pure and consists of a subset of the resources on which it applies a fixed weight. Such games represent unsplittable…

We study network connection games where the nodes of a network perform edge swaps in order to improve their communication costs. For the model proposed by Alon et al. (2010), in which the selfish cost of a node is the sum of all shortest…

Network congestion games are a convenient model for reasoning about routing problems in a network: agents have to move from a source to a target vertex while avoiding congestion, measured as a cost depending on the number of players using…

The dense deployment of small-cell base stations in HetSNets requires efficient resource allocation techniques. More precisely, the problem of associating users to SBSs must be revised and carefully studied. This problem is NP-hard and…

In multicast network design games, a set of agents choose paths from their source locations to a common sink with the goal of minimizing their individual costs, where the cost of an edge is divided equally among the agents using it. Since…

In this work, we investigate an application of a Nash equilibrium seeking algorithm in a social network. In a networked game each player (user) takes action in response to other players' actions in order to decrease (increase) his cost…

In this paper we study quality measures of different solution concepts for the multicast network design game on a ring topology. We recall from the literature a lower bound of 4/3 and prove a matching upper bound for the price of stability,…

This paper addresses a class of network games played by dynamic agents using their outputs. Unlike most existing related works, the Nash equilibrium in this work is defined by functions of agent outputs instead of full agent states, which…

We model the formation of networks as the result of a game where by players act selfishly to get the portfolio of links they desire most. The integration of player strategies into the network formation model is appropriate for…

In routing games, the network performance at equilibrium can be significantly improved if we remove some edges from the network. This counterintuitive fact, widely known as Braess's paradox, gives rise to the (selfish) network design…

This paper addresses the matter of inequality in network formation games. We employ a quantity that we are calling the Nash Inequality Ratio (NIR), defined as the maximal ratio between the highest and lowest costs incurred to individual…

In this paper we study a game where every player is to choose a vertex (facility) in a given undirected graph. All vertices (customers) are then assigned to closest facilities and a player's payoff is the number of customers assigned to it.…

We study a network formation game where agents receive benefits by forming connections to other agents but also incur both direct and indirect costs from the formed connections. Specifically, once the agents have purchased their…

In selfish bin packing, each item is regarded as a selfish player, who aims to minimize the cost-share by choosing a bin it can fit in. To have a least number of bins used, cost-sharing rules play an important role. The currently best known…