相关论文: Bounded-Distance Network Creation Games

We study {\em bottleneck routing games} where the social cost is determined by the worst congestion on any edge in the network. In the literature, bottleneck games assume player utility costs determined by the worst congested edge in their…

An atomic routing game is a multiplayer game on a directed graph. Each player in the game chooses a path -- a sequence of links that connect its origin node to its destination node -- with the lowest cost, where the cost of each link is a…

Distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problem for multi-coalition games has attracted increasing attention in recent years, but the research mainly focuses on the case without agreement demand within coalitions. This paper considers a…

We study stable matching problems in networks where players are embedded in a social context, and may incorporate friendship relations or altruism into their decisions. Each player is a node in a social network and strives to form a good…

An active line of research has considered games played on networks in which payoffs depend on both a player's individual decision and also the decisions of her neighbors. Such games have been used to model issues including the formation of…

The Internet has emerged as perhaps the most important network in modern computing, but rather miraculously, it was created through the individual actions of a multitude of agents rather than by a central planning authority. This motivates…

This paper considers a distributed gossip approach for finding a Nash equilibrium in networked games on graphs. In such games a player's cost function may be affected by the actions of any subset of players. An interference graph is…

We propose a type of non-cooperative game, termed multi-cluster aggregative game, which is composed of clusters as players, where each cluster consists of collaborative agents with cost functions depending on their own decisions and the…

We analyze a game-theoretic abstraction of epidemic containment played on an undirected graph $G$: each player is associated with a node in $G$ and can either acquire protection from a contagious process or risk infection. After decisions…

One of the major outstanding foundational problems about boolean functions is the sensitivity conjecture, which (in one of its many forms) asserts that the degree of a boolean function (i.e. the minimum degree of a real polynomial that…

Designing optimal interdependent networks is important for the robustness and efficiency of national critical infrastructures. Here, we establish a two-person game-theoretic model in which two network designers choose to maximize the global…

In this paper we show that the price of stability of Shapley network design games on undirected graphs with k players is at most (k^3(k+1)/2-k^2) / (1+k^3(k+1)/2-k^2) H_k = (1 - \Theta(1/k^4)) H_k, where H_k denotes the k-th harmonic…

The robustness of multiagent systems can be affected by mistakes or behavioral biases (e.g., risk-aversion, altruism, toll-sensitivity), with some agents playing the "wrong game." This can change the set of equilibria, and may in turn harm…

The decisions that human beings make to allocate time has significant bearing on economic output and to the sustenance of social networks. The time allocation problem motivates our formal analysis of the resource allocation game, where…

How do rational agents self-organize when trying to connect to a common target? We study this question with a simple tree formation game which is related to the well-known fair single-source connection game by Anshelevich et al. (FOCS'04)…

We introduce natural strategic games on graphs, which capture the idea of coordination in a local setting. We study the existence of equilibria that are resilient to coalitional deviations of unbounded and bounded size (i.e., strong…

We give exponential lower bounds on the Price of Stability (PoS) of weighted congestion games with polynomial cost functions. In particular, for any positive integer $d$ we construct rather simple games with cost functions of degree at most…

We study a general scenario of simultaneous contests that allocate prizes based on equal sharing: each contest awards its prize to all players who satisfy some contest-specific criterion, and the value of this prize to a winner decreases as…

We consider a game where a finite number of retailers choose a location, given that their potential consumers are distributed on a network. Retailers do not compete on price but only on location, therefore each consumer shops at the closest…

We study the interaction between a network designer and an adversary over a dynamical network. The network consists of nodes performing continuous-time distributed averaging. The adversary strategically disconnects a set of links to prevent…