相关论文: Lipschitz Games

We study the performance of Fictitious Play, when used as a heuristic for finding an approximate Nash equilibrium of a 2-player game. We exhibit a class of 2-player games having payoffs in the range [0,1] that show that Fictitious Play…

Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their payoffs depend on an…

The paper is devoted to the first-order mean field game system in the case when the distribution of players can contain atoms. The proposed definition of a generalized solution is based on the minimax approach to the Hamilton-Jacobi…

Subgame perfect equilibria are specific Nash equilibria in perfect information games in extensive form. They are important because they relate to the rationality of the players. They always exist in infinite games with continuous…

Leveraging tools from the study of linear fractional transformations and algebraic Riccati equations, a local characterization of consistent conjectural variations equilibrium is given for two player games on continuous action spaces with…

In this article, we consider mean field games between a dominating player and a group of representative agents, each of which acts similarly and also interacts with each other through a mean field term being substantially influenced by the…

This paper has two central aims: first, to provide simple conditions under which the generalized games in choice form and, consequently, the abstract economies, admit equilibrium; second, to study the solvability of several types of systems…

We consider the strategic interaction of traders in a continuous-time financial market with Epstein-Zin-type recursive intertemporal preferences and performance concerns. We derive explicitly an equilibrium for the finite player and the…

We investigate zero-sum turn-based two-player stochastic games in which the objective of one player is to maximize the amount of rewards obtained during a play, while the other aims at minimizing it. We focus on games in which the minimizer…

In this paper, we study the number of equilibria of the replicator-mutator dynamics for both deterministic and random multi-player two-strategy evolutionary games. For deterministic games, using Decartes' rule of signs, we provide a formula…

The winning condition of a parity game with costs requires an arbitrary, but fixed bound on the cost incurred between occurrences of odd colors and the next occurrence of a larger even one. Such games quantitatively extend parity games…

In this paper we unify, simplify, and extend previous work on the evolutionary dynamics of symmetric $N$-player matrix games with two pure strategies. In such games, gains from switching strategies depend, in general, on how many other…

For a class of systems of semi-linear elliptic equations, including \[ -\Delta u_i=f_i(x,u_i) - \beta u_i\sum_{j\neq i}a_{ij}u_j^p,\qquad i=1,\dots,k, \] for $p=2$ (variational-type interaction) or $p = 1$ (symmetric-type interaction), we…

Consider a game consisting of independent turns with even money payoffs in which the player wins with a fixed probability $p \geq 1/3$ and loses with probability $1 - p$. The Labouchere system is a betting strategy which entails keeping a…

Strategic-form min-max game theory examines the existence, multiplicity, selection of equilibria, and the worst-case computational complexity under perfect rationality. However, in many applications, games are drawn from an ensemble, and…

We study a simple adaptive model in the framework of an N -player normal form game. The model consists of a repeated game where the players only know their own action space and their own payoff scored at each stage, not those of the other…

We show that under some general conditions the finite memory determinacy of a class of two-player win/lose games played on finite graphs implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium built from finite memory strategies for the corresponding…

In Stackelberg v/s Stackelberg games a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium problems are plagued by the nonuniqueness of…

We study multi-player games with perfect information and general payoff function, where the set of stages is the set of non-positive integers $\{\ldots,-2,-1,0\}$. We define two related equilibrium concepts: one considering only deviations…

In the standard minority game, each agent in the minority group receives the same payoff regardless of the size of the minority group. Of great interest for real social and biological systems are cases in which the payoffs to members of the…