相关论文: Pure Saddle Points and Symmetric Relative Payoff G…
In a zero-sum stochastic game, at each stage, two adversary players take decisions and receive a stage payoff determined by them and by a controlled random variable representing the state of nature. The total payoff is the normalized…
We prove that every two-player non-zero-sum Borel game with lower-semi-continuous payoffs admits a subgame-perfect $\ep$-equilibrium. This result complements Example 3 in Solan and Vieille (2003), which shows that a subgame-perfect…
We consider zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information and finitely many states and actions. The payoff is computed by a function which associates to each infinite sequence of states and actions a real number. We prove that if the…
Symmetry is inherent in the definition of most of the two-player zero-sum games, including parity, mean-payoff, and discounted-payoff games. It is therefore quite surprising that no symmetric analysis techniques for these games exist. We…
Unlike Poker where the action space $\mathcal{A}$ is discrete, differential games in the physical world often have continuous action spaces not amenable to discrete abstraction, rendering no-regret algorithms with…
We consider a class of two-player zero-sum stochastic games with finite state and compact control spaces, which we call stochastic shortest path (SSP) games. They are undiscounted total cost stochastic dynamic games that have a cost-free…
In this paper, we present an online learning approach for two-player zero-sum linear quadratic games with unknown dynamics. We develop a framework combining regularized least squares model estimation, high probability confidence sets, and…
In this paper, we introduce several types of correspondences: weakly naturally quasiconvex, *-weakly naturally quasiconvex, weakly biconvex and correspondences with *--weakly convex graph and we prove some fixed point theorems for these…
In this work, we investigate a security game between an attacker and a defender, originally proposed in \cite{emadi2019security}. As is well known, the combinatorial nature of security games leads to a large cost matrix. Therefore,…
We consider a general nonzero-sum impulse game with two players. The main mathematical contribution of the paper is a verification theorem which provides, under some regularity conditions, a suitable system of quasi-variational inequalities…
We give a simple proof of the well-known result that the marginal strategies of a coarse correlated equilibrium form a Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games. A corollary of this fact is that no-external-regret learning algorithms…
We consider 2-player zero-sum stochastic games where each player controls his own state variable living in a compact metric space. The terminology comes from gambling problems where the state of a player represents its wealth in a casino.…
In~[1],authors considered a general finite horizon model of dynamic game of asymmetric information, where N players have types evolving as independent Markovian process, where each player observes its own type perfectly and actions of all…
In this paper, we investigate the existence and characterization of the value for a two-player zero-sum differential game with symmetric incomplete information on a continuum of initial positions and with signal revelation. Before the game…
In this paper, $2\times2$ zero-sum games are studied under the following assumptions: $(1)$ One of the players (the leader) commits to choose its actions by sampling a given probability measure (strategy); $(2)$ The leader announces its…
This paper proposes a new method for finding closed-loop saddle points in zero-sum linear-quadratic stochastic differential games by decoupling their inherent structure. Specifically, we develop a nested iterative scheme that constructs a…
This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept "robust perfect equilibrium" for non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations. Such an equilibrium is shown to exist (in symmetric mixed…
Definable zero-sum stochastic games involve a finite number of states and action sets, reward and transition functions that are definable in an o-minimal structure. Prominent examples of such games are finite, semi-algebraic or globally…
We study a model of two-player, zero-sum, stopping games with asymmetric information. We assume that the payoff depends on two continuous-time Markov chains (X, Y), where X is only observed by player 1 and Y only by player 2, implying that…
We study the infinite horizon discrete time N-player nonzero-sum Dynkin game ($N \geq 2$) with stopping times as strategies (or pure strategies). We prove existence of an $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibrium point for the game by presenting a…