相关论文: Frugal Mechanism Design via Spectral Techniques

Maximizing utility with a budget constraint is the primary goal for advertisers in real-time bidding (RTB) systems. The policy maximizing the utility is referred to as the optimal bidding strategy. Earlier works on optimal bidding strategy…

We design an expected polynomial-time, truthful-in-expectation, (1-1/e)-approximation mechanism for welfare maximization in a fundamental class of combinatorial auctions. Our results apply to bidders with valuations that are m matroid rank…

Mobility-on-demand systems are transforming the way we think about the transportation of people and goods. Most research effort has been placed on scalability issues for systems with a large number of agents and simple pick-up/drop-off…

Fairness is well studied in the context of resource allocation. Researchers have proposed various fairness notions like envy-freeness (EF), and its relaxations, proportionality and max-min share (MMS). There is vast literature on the…

Multi-Agent Path Finding (MAPF) involves determining paths for multiple agents to travel simultaneously and collision-free through a shared area toward given goal locations. This problem is computationally complex, especially when dealing…

This paper studies the problem of estimating the grahpon model - the underlying generating mechanism of a network. Graphon estimation arises in many applications such as predicting missing links in networks and learning user preferences in…

Most work in mechanism design assumes that buyers are risk neutral; some considers risk aversion arising due to a non-linear utility for money. Yet behavioral studies have established that real agents exhibit risk attitudes which cannot be…

We study a fair division problem with indivisible items, namely the computation of maximin share allocations. Given a set of $n$ players, the maximin share of a single player is the best she can guarantee to herself, if she would partition…

In several applications in distributed systems, an important design criterion is ensuring that the network is sparse, i.e., does not contain too many edges, while achieving reliable connectivity. Sparsity ensures communication overhead…

The fidelity and utility of synthetic network traffic are critically compromised by architectural mismatch across heterogeneous network datasets and prevalent scalability failure. This study addresses this challenge by establishing an…

Our aim is to design mechanisms that motivate all agents to reveal their predictions truthfully and promptly. For myopic agents, proper scoring rules induce truthfulness. However, as has been described in the literature, when agents take…

Submodular optimization has become increasingly prominent in machine learning and fairness has drawn much attention. In this paper, we propose to study the fair $k$-submodular maximization problem and develop a $\frac{1}{3}$-approximation…

This paper discusses highly general mechanisms for specifying the refinement of a real-time system as a collection of lower level parallel components that preserve the timing and functional requirements of the upper level specification.…

We study the problem of design of strategyproof in expectation (SP) mechanisms for facility location on a cycle, with the objective of minimizing the sum of costs of $n$ agents. We show that there exists an SP mechanism that attains an…

The $k$-batch greedy strategy is an approximate algorithm to solve optimization problems where the optimal solution is hard to obtain. Starting with the empty set, the $k$-batch greedy strategy adds a batch of $k$ elements to the current…

We study the problem of social welfare maximization in bilateral trade, where two agents, a buyer and a seller, trade an indivisible item. We consider arguably the simplest form of mechanisms -- the fixed-price mechanisms, where the…

Modelling systems with networks has been a powerful approach to tame the complexity of several phenomena. Unfortunately, such an approach is often made difficult by the large number of variables to take into consideration. Methods of…

We study mechanism design when a designer repeatedly uses a fixed mechanism to interact with strategic agents who learn from observing their allocations. We introduce a static framework, calibrated mechanism design, requiring mechanisms to…

Traditional studies of combinatorial auctions often only consider linear constraints (by which the demands for certain goods are limited by the corresponding supplies). The rise of smart grid presents a new class of auctions, characterized…

We give unconditional parameterized complexity lower bounds on pure dynamic programming algorithms - as modeled by tropical circuits - for connectivity problems such as the Traveling Salesperson Problem. Our lower bounds are higher than the…