相关论文: Selection of dynamical rules in spatial Prisoner's…
The observed cooperation on the level of genes, cells, tissues, and individuals has been the object of intense study by evolutionary biologists, mainly because cooperation often flourishes in biological systems in apparent contradiction to…
Dynamics of evolutionary games strongly depend on underlying networks. We study the coevolutionary prisoner's dilemma in which players change their local networks as well as strategies (i.e., cooperate or defect). This topic has been…
The Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game is used in several fields due to the emergence of cooperation among selfish players. Here, we have considered a one-dimensional lattice, where each cell represents a player, that can cooperate or defect.…
In this paper, the Optional Prisoner's Dilemma game in a spatial environment, with coevolutionary rules for both the strategy and network links between agents, is studied. Using a Monte Carlo simulation approach, a number of experiments are…
Evolutionary game theory assumes that players replicate a highly scored player's strategy through genetic inheritance. However, when learning occurs culturally, it is often difficult to recognize someone's strategy just by observing the…
We have studied an evolutionary game with spatially arranged players who can choose one of the two strategies (named cooperation and defection for social dilemmas) when playing with their neighbors. In addition to the application of the…
Exploiting others is beneficial individually but it could also be detrimental globally. The reverse is also true: a higher cooperation level may change the environment in a way that is beneficial for all competitors. To explore the possible…
We present a detailed study of prisoner's dilemma game with stochastic modifications on a two-dimensional lattice, in presence of evolutionary dynamics. By very nature of the rules, the cooperators have incentive to cheat and the fear to…
Strategy changes are an essential part of evolutionary games. Here we introduce a simple rule that, depending on the value of a single parameter $w$, influences the selection of players that are considered as potential sources of the new…
The emergence of complex networks from evolutionary games is studied occurring when agents are allowed to switch interaction partners. For this purpose a coevolutionary iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game is defined on a random network with…
We studied spatial Prisoner's Dilemma and Stag Hunt games where both the strategy distribution and the players' individual noise level could evolve to reach higher individual payoff. Players are located on the sites of different…
Cooperative behavior is prevalent in both human society and nature. Understanding the emergence and maintenance of cooperation among self-interested individuals remains a significant challenge in evolutionary biology and social sciences.…
We propose two new evolutionary rules that is not mimic evolution of strategies based on the spatial Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). The former follows the selfish evolutionary rule and then the coexistence phase appears with weak phase transition…
We have proposed two new evolutionary rules on spatio-iterated games that is not mimic evolution of strategies, and mainly discussed the Prisoner's Dilemma game \cite{toyota2} by the two evoutionary rules \cite{toyota3}. In this paper we…
We study a spatial Prisoner's dilemma game with two types (A and B) of players located on a square lattice. Players following either cooperator or defector strategies play Prisoner's Dilemma games with their 24 nearest neighbors. The…
Competition among cooperators, defectors, and loners is studied in an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with optional participation. Loners are risk averse i.e. unwilling to participate and rather rely on small but fixed earnings. This…
A modified spatial prisoner's dilemma game with voluntary participation in Newman-Watts small-world networks is studied. Some reasonable ingredients are introduced to the game evolutionary dynamics: each agent in the network is a pure…
This paper is concerned with the death-birth updating process. This model is an example of a spatial game in which players located on the~$d$-dimensional integer lattice are characterized by one of two possible strategies and update their…
We study an evolutionary version of the Prisoner's Dilemma game, played by agents placed in a small-world network. Agents are able to change their strategy, imitating that of the most successful neighbor. We observe that different…
We study the evolution of behavior under reinforcement learning in a Prisoner's Dilemma where agents interact in a regular network and can learn about whether they play one-shot or repeatedly by incurring a cost of deliberation. With…