相关论文: Complementary cooperation, minimal winning coaliti…
We study the inverse power index problem for weighted voting games: the problem of finding a weighted voting game in which the power of the players is as close as possible to a certain target distribution. Our goal is to find algorithms…
Following Zhang and Grossi~(AAAI 2021), we study in more depth a variant of weighted voting games in which agents' weights are induced by a transitive support structure. This class of simple games is notably well suited to study the…
In many applications of cooperative game theory -- from corporate governance and cartel formation to parliamentary voting -- not all winning coalitions are feasible. Ideological distances, institutional constraints, or pre-electoral…
Weighted voting games are a well-known and useful class of succinctly representable simple games that have many real-world applications, e.g., to model collective decision-making in legislative bodies or shareholder voting. Among the…
Weighted voting games (WVG) are coalitional games in which an agent's contribution to a coalition is given by his it weight, and a coalition wins if its total weight meets or exceeds a given quota. These games model decision-making in…
In this dissertation, we analyze the computational properties of game-theoretic centrality measures. The key idea behind game-theoretic approach to network analysis is to treat nodes as players in a cooperative game, where the value of each…
Cheung and Piliouras (2020) recently showed that two variants of the Multiplicative Weights Update method - OMWU and MWU - display opposite convergence properties depending on whether the game is zero-sum or cooperative. Inspired by this…
The Penrose-Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index are the best-known and the most used tools to measure political power of voters in simple voting games. Most methods to calculate these power indices are based on counting winning…
Weighted voting games are frequently used in decision making. Each voter has a weight and a proposal is accepted if the weight sum of the supporting voters exceeds a quota. One line of research is the efficient computation of so-called…
A simple game $(N,v)$ is given by a set $N$ of $n$ players and a partition of~$2^N$ into a set~$\mathcal{L}$ of losing coalitions~$L$ with value $v(L)=0$ that is closed under taking subsets and a set $\mathcal{W}$ of winning coalitions $W$…
In this paper, we propose fast pseudo-polynomial-time algorithms for computing power indices in weighted majority games. We show that we can compute the Banzhaf index for all players in $O(n+q\log (q))$ time, where $n$ is the number of…
We study the population genetics of Evolution in the important special case of weak selection, in which all fitness values are assumed to be close to one another. We show that in this regime natural selection is tantamount to the…
This paper presents a universal representation of symmetric (permutation-invariant) functions with multidimensional variable-size variables. These representations help justify approximation methods that aggregate information from each…
Consider a situation with $n$ agents or players where some of the players form a coalition with a certain collective objective. Simple games are used to model systems that can decide whether coalitions are successful (winning) or not…
We consider how selfish agents are likely to share revenues derived from maintaining connectivity between important network servers. We model a network where a failure of one node may disrupt communication between other nodes as a…
We show that a cooperative game may be decomposed into a sum of component games, one for each player, using the combinatorial Hodge decomposition on a graph. This decomposition is shown to satisfy certain efficiency, null-player, symmetry,…
According to Shapley's game-theoretical result, there exists a unique game value of finite cooperative games that satisfies axioms on additivity, efficiency, null-player property and symmetry. The original setting requires symmetry with…
A simple game $(N,v)$ is given by a set $N$ of $n$ players and a partition of $2^N$ into a set $\mathcal{L}$ of losing coalitions $L$ with value $v(L)=0$ that is closed under taking subsets and a set $\mathcal{W}$ of winning coalitions $W$…
Quantification of human group-behavior has so far defied an empirical, falsifiable approach. This is due to tremendous difficulties in data acquisition of social systems. Massive multiplayer online games (MMOG) provide a fascinating new way…
Power indices are essential in assessing the contribution and influence of individual agents in multi-agent systems, providing crucial insights into collaborative dynamics and decision-making processes. While invaluable, traditional…