English

Simple Games versus Weighted Voting Games: Bounding the Critical Threshold Value

Computer Science and Game Theory 2020-04-08 v1

Abstract

A simple game (N,v)(N,v) is given by a set NN of nn players and a partition of~2N2^N into a set~L\mathcal{L} of losing coalitions~LL with value v(L)=0v(L)=0 that is closed under taking subsets and a set W\mathcal{W} of winning coalitions WW with v(W)=1v(W)=1. Simple games with α=minp0maxWW,LLp(L)p(W)<1\alpha= \min_{p\geq 0}\max_{W\in {\cal W}, L\in {\cal L}} \frac{p(L)}{p(W)}<1 are exactly the weighted voting games. We show that α14n\alpha\leq \frac{1}{4}n for every simple game (N,v)(N,v), confirming the conjecture of Freixas and Kurz (IJGT, 2014). For complete simple games, Freixas and Kurz conjectured that α=O(n)\alpha=O(\sqrt{n}). We prove this conjecture up to a lnn\ln n factor. We also prove that for graphic simple games, that is, simple games in which every minimal winning coalition has size~2, computing α\alpha is \NP-hard, but polynomial-time solvable if the underlying graph is bipartite. Moreover, we show that for every graphic simple game, deciding if α<a\alpha<a is polynomial-time solvable for every fixed a>0a>0.

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.1810.08841,
  title  = {Simple Games versus Weighted Voting Games: Bounding the Critical Threshold Value},
  author = {Frits Hof and Walter Kern and Sascha Kurz and Kanstantsin Pashkovich and Daniël Paulusma},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1810.08841},
  year   = {2020}
}

Comments

10 pages; the paper is a follow-up and merge of arXiv:1805.02192 and arXiv:1806.03170

R2 v1 2026-06-23T04:46:59.686Z