k-Prize Weighted Voting Games
Abstract
We introduce a natural variant of weighted voting games, which we refer to as k-Prize Weighted Voting Games. Such games consist of n players with weights, and k prizes, of possibly differing values. The players form coalitions, and the i-th largest coalition (by the sum of weights of its members) wins the i-th largest prize, which is then shared among its members. We present four solution concepts to analyse the games in this class, and characterise the existence of stable outcomes in games with three players and two prizes, and in games with uniform prizes. We then explore the efficiency of stable outcomes in terms of Pareto optimality and utilitarian social welfare. Finally, we study the computational complexity of finding stable outcomes.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2302.13888,
title = {k-Prize Weighted Voting Games},
author = {Wei-Chen Lee and David Hyland and Alessandro Abate and Edith Elkind and Jiarui Gan and Julian Gutierrez and Paul Harrenstein and Michael Wooldridge},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2302.13888},
year = {2023}
}
Comments
Accepted to AAMAS 2023