相关论文: Optimal Strategies in Perfect-Information Stochast…

In a game where both contestants have perfect information, there is a strict limit on how perfect that information can be. By contrast, when one player is deprived of all information, the limit on the other player's information disappears,…

This paper examines finite zero-sum stochastic games and demonstrates that when the game's duration is sufficiently long, there exists a pair of approximately optimal strategies such that the expected average payoff at any point in the game…

We study 2-player turn-based perfect-information stochastic games with countably infinite state space. The players aim at maximizing/minimizing the probability of a given event (i.e., measurable set of infinite plays), such as reachability,…

We prove that every repeated game with countably many players, finite action sets, and tail-measurable payoffs admits an $\epsilon$-equilibrium, for every $\epsilon > 0$.

Game Theory concepts have been successfully applied in a wide variety of domains over the past decade. Sports and games are one of the popular areas of game theory application owing to its merits and benefits in solving complex scenarios.…

Strategy improvement is a widely-used and well-studied class of algorithms for solving graph-based infinite games. These algorithms are parameterized by a switching rule, and one of the most natural rules is "all switches" which switches as…

This paper studies the equilibrium properties of the ``obvious strategy profile'' in large finite-player games. Each player in such a strategy profile simply adopts a randomized strategy as she would have used in a symmetric equilibrium of…

We study observation-based strategies for two-player turn-based games on graphs with omega-regular objectives. An observation-based strategy relies on imperfect information about the history of a play, namely, on the past sequence of…

A Bayesian game is said to have nested information if the players are ordered, and each player knows the types of all players that follow her in that order. We prove that all multiplayer Bayesian games with finite actions spaces, bounded…

Stochastic dynamic teams and games are rich models for decentralized systems and challenging testing grounds for multi-agent learning. Previous work that guaranteed team optimality assumed stateless dynamics, or an explicit coordination…

We show that an N-person non-cooperative semi-Markov game under limiting ratio average pay-off has a pure semi-stationary Nash equilibrium. In an earlier paper, the zero-sum two person case has been dealt with. The proof follows by reducing…

Graph games provide the foundation for modeling and synthesizing reactive processes. In the synthesis of stochastic reactive processes, the traditional model is perfect-information stochastic games, where some transitions of the game graph…

Imperfect information games (IIG) are games in which each player only partially observes the current game state. We study how to learn $\epsilon$-optimal strategies in a zero-sum IIG through self-play with trajectory feedback. We give a…

A model of stochastic games where multiple controllers jointly control the evolution of the state of a dynamic system but have access to different information about the state and action processes is considered. The asymmetry of information…

We consider two-player stochastic games played on a finite graph for infinitely many rounds. Stochastic games generalize both Markov decision processes (MDP) by adding an adversary player, and two-player deterministic games by adding…

This work considers two-player zero-sum semi-Markov games with incomplete information on one side and perfect observation. At the beginning, the system selects a game type according to a given probability distribution and informs to Player…

We propose a probabilistic hyperlogic called HyperSt$^2$ that can express hyperproperties of strategies in turn-based stochastic games. To the best of our knowledge, HyperSt$^2$ is the first hyperlogic for stochastic games. HyperSt$^2$ can…

We construct subgame-perfect equilibria with mixed strategies for symmetric stochastic timing games with arbitrary strategic incentives. The strategies are qualitatively different for local first- or second-mover advantages, which we…

Decentralized optimization of distributed stochastic differential systems has been an active area of research for over half a century. Its formulation utilizing static team and person-by-person optimality criteria is well investigated.…

In this paper, we introduce regularized stochastic team problems. Under mild assumptions, we prove that there exists an unique fixed point of the best response operator, where this unique fixed point is the optimal regularized team decision…