具有可数多玩家与尾可测收益的重复博弈中的均衡
最优化与控制
2021-06-09 v1 计算机科学与博弈论
摘要
我们证明,每一个具有可数多玩家、有限行动集和尾可测收益的重复博弈,对每一个 都存在一个 -均衡。
引用
@article{arxiv.2106.03975,
title = {Equilibria in Repeated Games with Countably Many Players and Tail-Measurable Payoffs},
author = {Galit Ashkenazi-Golan and Janos Flesch and Arkadi Predtetchinski and Eilon Solan},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2106.03975},
year = {2021}
}