相关论文: On Pure and (approximate) Strong Equilibria of Fac…
We study Nash equilibria and the price of anarchy in the classical model of Network Creation Games introduced by Fabrikant et al. In this model every agent (node) buys links at a prefixed price $\alpha>0$ in order to get connected to the…
Synthesis of finite-state controllers from high-level specifications in multi-agent systems can be reduced to solving multi-player concurrent games over finite graphs. The complexity of solving such games with qualitative objectives for…
This paper investigates design of noncooperative games from an optimization and control theoretic perspective. Pricing mechanisms are used as a design tool to ensure that the Nash equilibrium of a fairly general class of noncooperative…
An active line of research has considered games played on networks in which payoffs depend on both a player's individual decision and also the decisions of her neighbors. Such games have been used to model issues including the formation of…
A Nash Equilibrium (NE) is a strategy profile resilient to unilateral deviations, and is predominantly used in the analysis of multiagent systems. A downside of NE is that it is not necessarily stable against deviations by coalitions. Yet,…
The dense deployment of small-cell base stations in HetSNets requires efficient resource allocation techniques. More precisely, the problem of associating users to SBSs must be revised and carefully studied. This problem is NP-hard and…
Caching networks can reduce the routing costs of accessing contents by caching contents closer to users. However, cache nodes may belong to different entities and behave selfishly to maximize their own benefits, which often lead to…
We study a model of competition among nomadic agents for time-varying and location-specific resources, arising in crowd-sourced transportation services, online communities, and traditional location-based economic activity. This model…
In this paper, we study mechanism design for single-facility location games where each agent has multiple private locations in [0, 1]. The individual objective is a satisfaction function that measures the discrepancy between the optimal…
We introduce a new class of games called the networked common goods game (NCGG), which generalizes the well-known common goods game. We focus on a fairly general subclass of the game where each agent's utility functions are the same across…
We study the computation of approximate pure Nash equilibria in Shapley value (SV) weighted congestion games, introduced in [19]. This class of games considers weighted congestion games in which Shapley values are used as an alternative (to…
The efficiency of a game is typically quantified by the price of anarchy (PoA), defined as the worst ratio of the objective function value of an equilibrium --- solution of the game --- and that of an optimal outcome. Given the tremendous…
This paper deals with the complexity of the problem of computing a pure Nash equilibrium for discrete preference games and network coordination games beyond $O(\log n)$-treewidth and tree metric spaces. First, we estimate the number of…
People, robots, and companies mostly divide time and effort among projects, and \defined{shared effort games} model people investing resources in public endeavors and sharing the generated values. In linear $\theta$ sharing (effort) games,…
We study strategic games on weighted directed graphs, in which the payoff of a player is defined as the sum of the weights on the edges from players who chose the same strategy, augmented by a fixed non-negative integer bonus for picking a…
We consider structural and algorithmic questions related to the Nash dynamics of weighted congestion games. In weighted congestion games with linear latency functions, the existence of (pure Nash) equilibria is guaranteed by potential…
Game-theoretic models relevant for computer science applications usually feature a large number of players. The goal of this paper is to develop an analytical framework for bounding the price of anarchy in such models. We demonstrate the…
The price of anarchy has become a standard measure of the efficiency of equilibria in games. Most of the literature in this area has focused on establishing worst-case bounds for specific classes of games, such as routing games or more…
In this paper, we develop a hierarchical Bayesian game framework for automated dynamic offset selection. Users compete to maximize their throughput by picking the best locally serving radio access network (RAN) with respect to their own…
We consider normal-form games with $n$ players and two strategies for each player, where the payoffs are i.i.d. random variables with some distribution $F$ and we consider issues related to the pure equilibria in the game as the number of…