相关论文: Copeland Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control

We consider the possibility of designing an election method that eliminates the incentives for a voter to rank any other candidate equal to or ahead of his or her sincere favorite. We refer to these methods as satisfying the ``Strong…

A variety of constructive manipulation, control, and bribery problems for approval-based multiwinner voting have been extensively studied recently. However, their destructive counterparts seem to be less explored. This paper investigates…

Most work on manipulation assumes that all preferences are known to the manipulators. However, in many settings elections are open and sequential, and manipulators may know the already cast votes but may not know the future votes. We…

Consider the problem of covertly controlling a linear system. In this problem, Alice desires to control (stabilize or change the parameters of) a linear system, while keeping an observer, Willie, unable to decide if the system is indeed…

Combinatorial auctions (CA) are a well-studied area in algorithmic mechanism design. However, contrary to the standard model, empirical studies suggest that a bidder's valuation often does not depend solely on the goods assigned to him. For…

Candidate control of elections is the study of how adding or removing candidates can affect the outcome. However, the traditional study of the complexity of candidate control is in the model in which all candidates and votes are known up…

Classical coding-theoretic guarantees often rely on trust assumptions, such as requiring sufficiently many honest nodes compared with adversarial ones. These assumptions are difficult to enforce in open decentralized systems where…

This paper builds upon the work of Dougherty and Heckelman (2020) by determining the frequency that 13 voting systems violate Arrow's social choice criteria with up to six alternatives. These results determine which of the 13 voting…

This paper studies the robustness of reinforcement learning algorithms to errors in the learning process. Specifically, we revisit the benchmark problem of discrete-time linear quadratic regulation (LQR) and study the long-standing open…

We present a novel model for the effect of echo chambers, filter bubbles, and reinforcement on election results. Our model extends the well known voter model with zealots to include reinforcement. We analyze the behaviour of the model,…

Participatory budgeting (PB) is a democratic process for allocating funds to projects based on the votes of community members. PB outcomes are commonly evaluated for how they reflect voters preferences (e.g., social welfare) and the extent…

Consider the problem of covertly controlling a linear system. In this problem, Alice desires to control (stabilize or change the behavior of) a linear system, while keeping an observer, Willie, unable to decide if the system is indeed being…

We consider the problem of robust and adaptive model predictive control (MPC) of a linear system, with unknown parameters that are learned along the way (adaptive), in a critical setting where failures must be prevented (robust). This…

Participatory budgeting (PB) is a democratic process for allocating funds to projects based on the votes of members of the community. Different rules have been used to aggregate participants' votes. Past research has studied the trade-off…

Determination of the range of a variety of social choice correspondences: Plurality voting, the Borda rule, the Pareto rule, the Copeland correspondence, approval voting, and the top cycle correspondence

We study the design of voting rules in the metric distortion framework. It is known that any deterministic rule suffers distortion of at least $3$, and that randomized rules can achieve distortion strictly less than $3$, often at the cost…

Conformal prediction (CP) is a wrapper around traditional machine learning models, giving coverage guarantees under the sole assumption of exchangeability; in classification problems, for a chosen significance level $\varepsilon$, CP…

Prior work on the complexity of bribery assumes that the bribery happens simultaneously, and that the briber has full knowledge of all voters' votes. But neither of those assumptions always holds. In many real-world settings, votes come in…

Motivated by civic problems such as participatory budgeting and multiwinner elections, we consider the problem of public good allocation: Given a set of indivisible projects (or candidates) of different sizes, and voters with different…

The first step in classifying the complexity of an NP problem is typically showing the problem in P or NP-complete. This has been a successful first step for many problems, including voting problems. However, in this paper we show that this…