相关论文: Copeland Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control
The classical paradox of social choice theory asserts that there is no fair way to deterministically select a winner in an election among more than two candidates; the only definite collective preferences are between individual pairs of…
It is well known that no reasonable voting rule is strategyproof. Moreover, the common Plurality rule is particularly prone to strategic behavior of the voters and empirical studies show that people often vote strategically in practice.…
Though voting-based consensus algorithms in Blockchain outperform proof-based ones in energy- and transaction-efficiency, they are prone to incur wrong elections and bribery elections. The former originates from the uncertainties of…
[HHM20] discovered, for 7 pairs (C,D) of seemingly distinct standard electoral control types, that C and D are identical: For each input I and each election system, I is a Yes instance of both C and D, or of neither. Surprisingly this had…
The knockoff filter of Barber and Candes (arXiv:1404.5609) is a flexible framework for multiple testing in supervised learning models, based on introducing synthetic predictor variables to control the false discovery rate (FDR). Using the…
Studying distributed computing through the lens of algebraic topology has been the source of many significant breakthroughs during the last two decades, especially in the design of lower bounds or impossibility results for deterministic…
We study the problem of coalitional manipulation---where $k$ manipulators try to manipulate an election on $m$ candidates---under general scoring rules, with a focus on the Borda protocol. We do so both in the weighted and unweighted…
An important problem in computational social choice theory is the complexity of undesirable behavior among agents, such as control, manipulation, and bribery in election systems. These kinds of voting strategies are often tempting at the…
Impartial selection problems are concerned with the selection of one or more agents from a set based on mutual nominations from within the set. To avoid strategic nominations of the agents, the axiom of impartiality requires that the…
Most work on manipulation assumes that all preferences are known to the manipulators. However, in many settings elections are open and sequential, and manipulators may know the already cast votes but may not know the future votes. We…
We study cooperative control dynamics with gradient based forcing terms. As a specific example, we focus on source-seeking dynamics with vehicles embedded in an unknown scalar field with a subset of agents having gradient information. As…
Random selection, leader election, and collective coin flipping are fundamental tasks in fault-tolerant distributed computing. We study these problems in the full-information model where despite decades of study, key gaps remain in our…
We show a new proof for the fact that when $\kappa$ and $\lambda$ are infinite cardinals satisfying $\lambda ^ \kappa = \lambda$, the cofinality of the set of all functions from $\lambda$ to $\kappa$ ordered by everywhere domination is…
Let $\Delta$ be the Dirichlet Laplacian on the interval $(0,\pi)$. The null controllability properties of the equation $$u_{tt}+\Delta^2 u+\rho (\Delta)^\alpha u_t=F(x,t)$$ are studied. Let $T>0$, and assume initial conditions $(u^0,u^1)\in…
In many real world elections, agents are not required to rank all candidates. We study three of the most common methods used to modify voting rules to deal with such partial votes. These methods modify scoring rules (like the Borda count),…
Prior work on the complexity of bribery assumes that the bribery happens simultaneously, and that the briber has full knowledge of all votes. However, in many real-world settings votes come in sequentially, and the briber may have a…
We consider data in the form of pairwise comparisons of n items, with the goal of precisely identifying the top k items for some value of k < n, or alternatively, recovering a ranking of all the items. We analyze the Copeland counting…
Deep learning models are intrinsically sensitive to distribution shifts in the input data. In particular, small, barely perceivable perturbations to the input data can force models to make wrong predictions with high confidence. An common…
In approval-based multiwinner voting, voters express approval preferences over a set of candidates, and the goal is to return a winning committee. This model captures a broad range of subset selection problems under preferences. Prior work…
This paper deals with strong structural controllability of linear systems. In contrast to existing work, the structured systems studied in this paper have a so-called zero/nonzero/arbitrary structure, which means that some of the entries…