相关论文: Copeland Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control

External controls from historical trials or observational data can augment randomized controlled trials when large-scale randomization is impractical or unethical, such as in drug evaluation for rare diseases. However, non-randomized…

In approval-based committee (ABC) voting, the goal is to choose a subset of predefined size of the candidates based on the voters' approval preferences over the candidates. While this problem has attracted significant attention in recent…

Explanations of the replication crisis often emphasize misconduct, questionable research practices, or incentive misalignment, implying that behavioral reform is sufficient. This paper argues that a substantial component is architectural:…

Approval-based committee selection is a model of significant interest in social choice theory. In this model, we have a set of voters $\mathcal{V}$, a set of candidates $\mathcal{C}$, and each voter has a set $A_v \subset \mathcal{C}$ of…

The rebellious voter model, introduced by Sturm and Swart (2008), is a variation of the standard, one-dimensional voter model, in which types that are locally in the minority have an advantage. It is related, both through duality and…

The knockoff filter is a recent false discovery rate (FDR) control method for high-dimensional linear models. We point out that knockoff has three key components: ranking algorithm, augmented design, and symmetric statistic, and each…

Mechanism design is concerned with settings where a policymaker (or social planner) faces the problem of aggregating the announced preferences of multiple agents into a collective (or social), system-wide decision. One of the most important…

We initiate the study of bribery problem in the context of gerrymandering and reverse gerrymandering. In our most general problem, the input is a set of voters having votes over a set of alternatives, a graph on the voters, a partition of…

We investigate the problem of computing the probability of winning in an election where voter attendance is uncertain. More precisely, we study the setting where, in addition to a total ordering of the candidates, each voter is associated…

Conformal prediction (CP) is widely presented as distribution-free predictive inference with finite-sample marginal coverage under exchangeability. We argue that CP is best understood as a rank-calibrated descendant of the…

We study the voting problem with two alternatives where voters' preferences depend on a not-directly-observable state variable. While equilibria in the one-round voting mechanisms lead to a good decision, they are usually hard to compute…

It is important to understand how the outcome of an election can be modified by an agent with control over the structure of the election. Electoral control has been studied for many election systems, but for all studied systems the winner…

We present theoretical and empirical results demonstrating the usefulness of voting rules for participatory democracies. We first give algorithms which efficiently elicit \epsilon-approximations to two prominent voting rules: the Borda rule…

Many applications, such as content moderation and recommendation, require reviewing and scoring a large number of alternatives. Doing so robustly is however very challenging. Indeed, voters' inputs are inevitably sparse: most alternatives…

Many binary collective choice situations can be described as weighted simple voting games. We introduce weighted committee games to model decisions on an arbitrary number of alternatives in analogous fashion. We compare the effect of…

For the interacting urn model with polynomial reinforcement, it has been conjectured that almost surely one color monopolizes all the urns if the interaction parameter $p>0$. We disprove the conjecture. For the case $p=1$, we give a…

The Coalitional Manipulation problem has been studied extensively in the literature for many voting rules. However, most studies have focused on the complete information setting, wherein the manipulators know the votes of the…

We consider elections where both voters and candidates can be associated with points in a metric space and voters prefer candidates that are closer to those that are farther away. It is often assumed that the optimal candidate is the one…

Robust control seeks stabilizing policies that perform reliably under adversarial disturbances, with $\mathcal{H}_\infty$ control as a classical formulation. It is known that policy optimization of robust $\mathcal{H}_\infty$ control…

This work contributes to a foundational question in economic theory: how do individual-level cognitive biases interact with collective choice mechanisms? We study a setting where voters hold intrinsic preference rankings over a set of…