理论经济学
We study a long-run persuasion problem where a long-lived Sender repeatedly interacts with a sequence of short-lived Receivers who may adopt a misspecified model for belief updating. The Sender commits to a stationary information structure,…
We examine receiver-optimal mechanisms for aggregating information divided across many biased senders. Each sender privately observes an unconditionally independent signal about an unknown state, so no sender can verify another's report. A…
We study a model of retail agglomeration where consumers are more likely to visit zones with a higher concentration of shops. This agglomerative effect makes zones with many retailers more attractive. The spatial distribution of retailers…
This paper derives a closed-form expression linking aggregate markups on imported inputs to concentration in a model of firm-to-firm trade with two-sided market power. Our theory extends standard oligopoly insights in two dimensions. First,…
This paper develops a new generation of the Keynesian Intertemporal Synthesis (KIS) Model, a macroeconomic framework designed to reconcile the empirical strengths of the Post-Keynesian (PK) and New Keynesian (NK) traditions. The central…
In this paper, we present the Tokenized Sovereign Debt Conversion Mechanism (TSDCM), a smart-contracted instrument that, upon meeting both debt-to-GDP and GDP-growth thresholds, automates the retirement of sovereign debt. TSDCM initiates…
I study the optimal voting mechanism for a committee that must decide whether to enact or block a policy of unknown benefit. Information can come both from committee members who can acquire it at cost, and a strategic lobbyist who wishes…
We propose a general methodology for recovering preference parameters from data on choices and response times. Our methods yield estimates with fast ($1/n$ for $n$ data points) convergence rates when specialized to the popular Drift…
A seller offers an asset in a decentralised market. Buyers have private signals about their common value. I study whether the market becomes allocatively more efficient with (i) more buyers, (ii) better-informed buyers. Both increase the…
An informed Advisor and an uninformed Decision-Maker, with conflicting interests, engage in repeated cheap talk communication in always new decision problems. While the Decision-Maker's optimal payoff is attainable in some subgame-perfect…
I develop a theoretical model to examine how the rise of autonomous AI (artificial intelligence) agents disrupts two-sided digital advertising markets. Through this framework, I demonstrate that users' rational, private decisions to…
We introduce and formalize misalignment, a phenomenon of interactive environments perceived from an analyst's perspective where an agent holds beliefs about another agent's beliefs that do not correspond to the actual beliefs of the latter.…
An employer contracts with a worker to incentivize efforts whose productivity depends on ability; the worker then enters a market that pays him contingent on ability evaluation. With non-additive monitoring technology, the interdependence…
This paper proposes normative criteria for voting rules under uncertainty about individual preferences. The criteria emphasize the importance of responsiveness, i.e., the probability that the social outcome coincides with the realized…
We examine functions representing the cumulative probability of a binomial random variable exceeding a threshold, expressed in terms of the success probability per trial. These functions are known to exhibit a unique inflection point. We…
We show that many models of choice can be alternatively represented as special cases of choice with limited attention (Masatlioglu, Nakajima, and Ozbay, 2012), singling out the properties of the unobserved attention filters that explain the…
We design profit-maximizing mechanisms to sell an excludable and non-rival good with positive and/or negative network effects. Buyers have heterogeneous private values that depend on how many others also consume the good. In optimum, an…
Two agents repeatedly compete for the power to set policy. A principal partially influences the power allocation. All three players may disagree on policy, but one agent (the ``friend'') aligns more closely with the principal than the other…
We study an optimal wage band problem in a competitive matching labor market where education signals worker ability. We prove uniqueness of the competitive signaling equilibrium under a general class of utility and profit functions and show…
We develop a model where currency issuers provide liquidity, while users in a trade network choose currency usage for trade settlement. We identify a feedback mechanism where a user's currency preference spillovers to others and increases…