理论经济学
Gilboa and Schmeidler's (1989) uncertainty aversion plays a central role in decision theory and economics, yet many inconsistent behaviors have been observed in experiments. Motivated by this, we study an axiom postulating a minimal degree…
We develop a general equilibrium model in which, at each instant, a short-run competitive equilibrium arises. Heterogeneity in factor allocation generates differential profit rates across sectors, prompting firms to move between them under…
When allocating indivisible objects via lottery, planners often use ordinal mechanisms, which elicit agents' rankings of objects rather than their full preferences over lotteries. In such an ordinal informational environment, planners…
This paper investigates the benefits of incorporating diversification effects into the pricing process of insurance policies from two different business lines. The paper shows that, for the same risk reduction, insurers pricing policies…
This paper studies the equilibrium properties of the ``obvious strategy profile'' in large finite-player games. Each player in such a strategy profile simply adopts a randomized strategy as she would have used in a symmetric equilibrium of…
We study soft budget constraints in multi-tier public finance when an upper-tier government uses two instruments: an ex-ante grant schedule and an ex-post rescue. Under convex rescue costs and standard primitives, the three-stage…
We consider long-lived agents who interact repeatedly in a social network. In each period, each agent learns about an unknown state by observing a private signal and her neighbors' actions from the previous period before choosing her own…
We present a macro-finance model with innovation and knowledge spillover. Skilled agents engage in R&D activities (establish firms) or work in the knowledge-intensive sector. Unskilled agents work in the traditional sector. Knowledge…
We explore the core concept in a generalization of the housing market model where agents own fractional endowments while maintaining ordinal preferences. Recognizing that individuals are easier than coalitions to block an allocation, we…
This paper analyzes Shinohara Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS), a variant of the classic RPS game introduced by board game designer Yoshiteru Shinohara. Players compete against a host who always plays rock, so players choose either rock or paper.…
Caseworkers in foster care systems match waiting children to adoptive homes. We use dynamic matching market design to characterize a class of mechanisms that incentivize expedient matches that homes can accept or decline. We design…
This paper addresses information design in a workhorse model of network games, where agents have linear best responses, the information designer maximizes a quadratic objective, and the payoff-relevant state follows a multivariate Gaussian…
Yu and Zhang (2025) introduce a new method for defining trading mechanisms in market design and apply it to develop new mechanisms that achieve efficiency and fairness in various models. However, their assumption of strict preferences…
We develop a method using parameterized linear equations to define trading mechanisms in market design models. Our method adeptly addresses challenges arising from factors such as complex endowments or coarse priorities, while offering…
The information investors acquire in asset markets has various forms. We refer to range information as information about the upper and lower bound which the payoff of an asset may reach in the future. This paper explores the market impacts…
Many widely used network centralities are based on counting walks that meet specific criteria. This paper introduces a systematic framework for walk enumeration using generating functions. We introduce a first-passage decomposition that…
We study a model of persuasion in which the receiver is a `conservative Bayesian' whose updated belief is a convex combination of the prior and the correct Bayesian posterior. While in the classic Bayesian case providing information…
We study fairness in the allocation of discrete goods. Exactly fair (envy-free) allocations are impossible, so we discuss notions of approximate fairness. In particular, we focus on allocations in which the swap of two items serves to…
We analyze inertial coordination games: dynamic coordination games with an endogenously changing state that depends on (i) a persistent fundamental players privately learn about over time; and (ii) past play. The speed of learning…
A perfectly divisible cake is to be divided among a group of agents. Each agent is entitled to a share between zero and one, and these entitlements are compatible in that they sum to one. The mediator does not know the preferences of the…