理论经济学
Generative AI is a technology which depends in part on participation by humans in training and improving the automation potential. We focus on the development of an "AI twin" that could complement its creator's efforts, enabling them to…
How can voters induce politicians to put forth more proximate (in terms of preference) as well as credible platforms (in terms of promise fulfillment) under repeated elections? Building on the work of Aragones et al. (2007), I study how…
I model a rational agent who experiences endogenous deadline pressure in the face of a fixed future deadline. The agent holds a resource stock, and opportunities to spend resources arise randomly according to a Poisson process. When the…
A seller posts a price for a single object. The seller's and buyer's values may be interdependent. We characterize the set of payoff vectors across all information structures. Simple feasibility and individual-rationality constraints…
A seller sells an object over time but is uncertain how the buyer learns their willingness-to-pay. We consider informational robustness under \textit{limited commitment}, where the seller offers a price \textit{each period} to maximize…
This paper studies contracting in the presence of externalities with a non-contractible outsider. Multiple equilibria arise from strategic symmetry between the insider agent and the outsider. To address strategic uncertainty, the principal…
We develop a novel analytical method for studying optimal paths in dynamic optimization problems under general monotonicity conditions. The method centers on a locator function -- a simple object constructed directly from the model's…
We introduce a novel choice dataset, called joint choice, in which options and menus are multidimensional. In this general setting, we define a notion of choice separability, which requires that selections from some dimensions are never…
In this paper, we study voting rules on the interval domain, where the alternatives are arranged according to an externally given strict total order and voters report intervals of this order to indicate the alternatives they support. For…
We explore a specific parametric example of a regime change game in which a policymaker defends the status quo against a continuum of atomistic agents who seek to overthrow it. At the start of the game, the policymaker can initiate a policy…
We embed observational learning (BHW) in a symmetric duopoly with random arrivals and search frictions. With fixed posted prices, a mixed-strategy pricing equilibrium exists and yields price dispersion even with ex-ante identical firms. We…
A benevolent advisor observes a project's complexity and posts a pass - fail threshold before the agent chooses effort. The project succeeds only if ability and effort together clear complexity. We compare two informational regimes. In the…
When does reputation make experts play it safe, and what policy reverses that? I isolate a single lever - visibility of outcomes. In a two-page model with binary signals and outcomes, I show: (i) with an uninformative safe option and…
We study a repeated sender-receiver game where inspections are public but the sender's action is hidden unless inspected. A detected deception ends the relationship or triggers a finite punishment. We show the public state is one…
We study expert advice under reputational incentives, with sell-side equity research as the lead application. A long-lived analyst receives a continuous private signal about a binary payoff and recommends a risky (Buy) or safe action.…
This paper examines when the public provision of information in search markets improves welfare. I consider a two-sided frictional search market in which buyers match with vertically differentiated sellers. The market is segmented into…
We propose a nonparametric method for estimating the distribution of consumer welfare from cross-sectional data with no restrictions on individual preferences. First demonstrating that moments of demand identify the curvature of the…
Artificial intelligence (AI) tools such as large language models (LLMs) are already altering student learning. Unlike previous technologies, LLMs can independently solve problems regardless of student understanding, yet are not always…
This paper studies how imprecision in noisy signals attenuates Bayesian updating toward the prior. This phenomenon is well-known under a normal prior and normal noise, where less precise signals yield posterior means closer to the prior…
Vicarious learning is a vital component of organizational learning. We theorize and model two fundamental processes underlying vicarious learning: observation of actions (learning what they do) vs. belief sharing (learning what they think).…