理论经济学

AI systems have the potential to improve decision-making, but decision makers face the risk that the AI may be misaligned with their objectives. We study this problem in the context of a treatment decision, where a designer decides which…

We propose a framework that uses majorization to model diversity and representativeness in school admissions. We generalize the standard notion of majorization to accommodate arbitrary distributional targets, such as a student body that…

Since McCallum (1987), it is well known that in an overlapping generations (OLG) economy with land, the equilibrium is Pareto efficient because with balanced growth, the interest rate exceeds the economic growth rate ($R>G$), which rules…

Many real matching markets encounter distributional and fairness constraints. Motivated by the Chinese Major Transition Program (CMT), this paper studies the design of exchange mechanisms within a fresh framework of both distributional and…

We study a noncooperative $n$-player game of slack allocation in which each player $j$ has entitlement $L_j>0$ and chooses a claim $C_j\ge0$. Let $v_j=(C_j-L_j)_+$ (overage) and $s_j=(L_j-C_j)_+$ (slack); set $X=\sum_j v_j$ and $I=\sum_j…

A principal contracts with an agent who sequentially searches over projects to generate a prize. The principal initially knows only one of the agent's available projects and evaluates a contract by its worst-case performance. We…

We study the robust regulation of contracts in moral hazard problems. A firm offers a contract to incentivise a worker protected by limited liability. A regulator restricts the set of permissible contracts to (i) improve efficiency and (ii)…

Completeness and transitivity are standard rationality conditions in economics. However, under ambiguity, decision makers sometimes violate these requirements because of the difficulty of forming accurate predictions about ambiguous events.…

This paper studies a matching problem in which a group of agents cooperate with agents on two sides. In environments with either nontransferable or transferable utilities, we demonstrate that a stable outcome exists when cooperations…

Proponents of Condorcet voting face the question of what to do in the rare case when no Condorcet winner exists. Recent work provides compelling arguments for the rule that should be applied in three-candidate elections, but already with…

We characterize incentive compatible mechanisms in environments with hidden types and flexible hidden actions. Our approach introduces extended recommendation schedules that specify prescribed actions also off-path, after misreports. This…

I propose the new axiom of Indifferent Points (IP) that can replace continuity axioms in classical expected utility representations under the Independence Axiom over a finite set of prices. IP asserts the existence of a set of indifferent…

We introduce and analyze a variation of the Bertrand game in which the revenue is shared between two players. This game models situations in which one economic agent can provide goods/services to consumers either directly or through an…

Recovering and distinguishing between the strict-preference, indifference and/or indecisiveness parts of a decision maker's preferences is a challenging task but also important for testing theory and conducting welfare analysis. This paper…

In this short paper, we define the investment ability of data investors in the data economy and its heterogeneity. We further construct an analytical heterogeneous agent model to demonstrate that differences in data investment ability lead…

This paper studies a two-player game in which the players face uncertainty regarding the nature of their partner. In this variation of the standard Prisoner's Dilemma, players may encounter an 'honest' type who always cooperates.…

This paper develops a model in which a sender strategically communicates with a group of receivers whose payoffs depend on the sender's information. It is shown that aggregate payoff externalities create an endogenous conflict of interests…

This paper builds a finite-horizon model to study the role of physical collateral in a model of strategic defaults, when the borrower can develop reputation for honesty. Asset ownership increases attractiveness of the reputational channel:…

We consider the optimal risk sharing problem with a continuum of agents, modeled via a non-atomic measure space. Individual preferences are not assumed to be convex. We show the multiplicity of agents induces the value function to be…

Equal pay laws increasingly require that workers doing "similar" work are paid equal wages within firm. We study such "equal pay for similar work" (EPSW) policies theoretically and test our model's predictions empirically using evidence…