Diversity in Choice as Majorization
Abstract
We propose a framework that uses majorization to model diversity and representativeness in school admissions. We generalize the standard notion of majorization to accommodate arbitrary distributional targets, such as a student body that reflects the population served by the school. Building on this framework, we introduce and axiomatically characterize the -targeting Schur choice rule, which balances diversity and priority in admissions. We show that this rule is optimal: any alternative rule must either leave seats unfilled, reduce diversity, or admit lower-priority students. The rule satisfies path independence (and substitutability), which guarantees desirable outcomes in matching markets. Our work contributes to the ongoing discourse on market design by providing a new and flexible framework for improving diversity and representation.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2407.17589,
title = {Diversity in Choice as Majorization},
author = {Federico Echenique and Teddy Mekonnen and M. Bumin Yenmez},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2407.17589},
year = {2025}
}