理论经济学
We introduce a new cost function over experiments, f-information, based on the theory of multivariate statistical divergences, that generalizes Sims's classic model of rational inattention as well as the class of posterior-separable cost…
We study a recommendation system where sellers compete for visibility by strategically offering commissions to a platform that optimally curates a ranked menu of items and their respective prices for each customer. Customers interact…
We study public persuasion when a sender communicates with a large audience that can fact-check at heterogeneous costs. The sender commits to a public information policy before the state is realized, but any verifiable claim she makes after…
In this paper, we introduce a novel equilibrium concept, called the equilibrium cycle, which seeks to capture the outcome of oscillatory game dynamics. Unlike the (pure) Nash equilibrium, which defines a fixed point of mutual best…
The random utility model, a cornerstone in economics, is axiomatized by Falmagne (1978) and McFadden and Richter (1990) with the assumption that if a menu is observable, the choice frequencies of all alternatives are also observable.…
The classic first-order approach (FOA) relaxes the principal-agent problem by replacing the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint with its first-order condition. We show that FOA is not a valid relaxation when the support of the outcome…
Deviations from Bayesian updating are traditionally categorized as biases, errors, or fallacies, thus implying their inherent ``sub-optimality.'' We offer a more nuanced view. We demonstrate that, in learning problems with misspecified…
This paper examines optimal risk sharing for empirically realistic risk attitudes, providing results on Pareto optimality, competitive equilibria, utility frontiers, and the first and second theorems of welfare. Contrary to common…
We study information disclosure in competitive markets with adverse selection. Sellers privately observe product quality, with higher quality entailing higher production costs, while buyers trade at the market-clearing price after observing…
Ensuring efficiency and envy-freeness in allocating indivisible goods without money often requires randomization. However, existing combinatorial assignment mechanisms (for applications such as course allocation, food banks, and refugee…
This paper analyzes optimal insurance design when the insurer internalizes the effect of coverage on third-party service prices. A monopolistic insurer contracts with risk-averse agents who have sequential two-dimensional private…
In settings like vaccination registries, individuals act after observing others, and the resulting public records can expose private information. We study privacy-preserving sequential learning, where agents add endogenous noise to their…
This paper introduces the Voting with Random Proposers (VRP) procedure to address the challenges of agenda manipulation in voting. In each round of VRP, a randomly selected proposer suggests an alternative that is voted on against the…
I study how to regulate firms' access to consumer data when a regulator faces non-Bayesian uncertainty about how firms will exploit the consumer's information to segment the market and set prices. I fully characterize all worst-case optimal…
An analyst is tasked with producing a statistical study. The analyst is not monitored and is able to manipulate the study. He can receive payments contingent on his report and trusted data collected from an independent source, modeled as a…
A screening instrument is costly if it is socially wasteful and productive otherwise. A principal screens an agent with multidimensional private information and quasilinear preferences that are additively separable across two components: a…
This note applies tightness (Kattwinkel and Preusser (2025)) to the setting of Border and Sobel (1987, "Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder"). Border and Sobel characterize efficient mechanisms and argue that efficiency…
We study consumption dependence in the context of random utility and repeated choice. We show that, in the presence of consumption dependence, the random utility model is a misspecified model of repeated rational choice. This…
This paper examines the characterizations of equilibrium in economies with public projects. Public goods, as discussed by Mas-Colell (1980), are modeled as elements of an abstract set lacking a unified ordering structure. We introduce the…
We consider a classic many-to-one matching setting, where participants need to be assigned to teams based on the preferences of both sides. Unlike most of the matching literature, we aim to provide fairness not only to participants, but…