理论经济学
This paper provides a general characterization of preferences that admit a Richter-Peleg representation without imposing completeness or transitivity. We establish that a binary relation on a nonempty set admits a Richter-Peleg…
We develop a purely theoretical mechanism in which provincial bailouts are disciplined by two levers derived from Weighted Representative Democracy (WRD): a political shadow cost of public funds and a weighted-consent cap on any transfer.…
We study the object reallocation problem under strict preferences. On the unrestricted domain, Ekici (2024) showed that the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism is the unique mechanism that is individually rational, pair efficient, and…
We study the design of voting mechanisms in a binary social choice environment where agents' cardinal valuations are independent but not necessarily identically distributed. The mechanism must be anonymous -- the outcome is invariant to…
The paper characterizes the Shannon (1948) and Tsallis (1988) entropies in a standard framework of decision theory, mixture sets. Procedural mixture sets are introduced as a variant of mixture sets in which it is not necessarily true that a…
We study the problem of an organization that matches agents to objects where agents have preference rankings over objects and the organization uses algorithms to construct a ranking over objects on behalf of each agent. Our new framework…
Political and advertising campaigns increasingly exploit social networks to spread information and persuade people. This paper studies a persuasion model to examine whether such a strategy is better than simply sending public signals.…
I study the optimal design of ratings to motivate agent investment in quality when transfers are unavailable. The principal designs a rating scheme that maps the agent's quality to a (possibly stochastic) score. The agent has private…
This paper recasts Gul (1991)'s theory of disappointment aversion in a Savage framework, with general outcomes, new explicit axioms of disappointment aversion, and novel explicit representations. These permit broader applications of the…
We consider object allocation problems with capacities (see, e.g., Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez, 1998; Basteck, 2025) where objects have to be assigned to agents. We show that if a lottery rule satisfies ex-post non-wastefulness and…
We consider a housing market model with limited externalities where agents care both about their own consumption via demand preferences and about the agent who receives their endowment via supply preferences (we extend the associated…
Artificial Intelligence (AI) can transform the knowledge economy by automating non-codifiable work. To analyze this transformation, we incorporate AI into an economy where humans form hierarchical organizations: Less knowledgeable…
When introducing a novel product, a seller sets a price and decides how much information to provide to a buyer, who may incur a search cost to discover an outside option. The buyer knows the outside option distribution; the seller knows…
We present the first formal treatment of \emph{yield tokenization}, a mechanism that decomposes yield-bearing assets into principal and yield components to facilitate risk transfer and price discovery in decentralized finance (DeFi). We…
This paper proposes a new lens for studying threshold games played on networks when the thresholds are heterogeneous. These are games where agents have two possible actions, and prefer action 1 if and only if enough of their neighbours…
We study a full implementation problem with a state unknown to the designer but known to agents, where agents have uncertain evidence privately drawn from state-dependent distributions. Stochastic evidence enables ``perfect deceptions,''…
We study the performance of different methods for processing information, incorporating narrative selection within an evolutionary model. All agents update their beliefs according to Bayes' Rule, but some strategically choose the narrative…
This paper develops a data-driven approach to Bayesian persuasion. The receiver is privately informed about the prior distribution of the state of the world, the sender knows the receiver's preferences but does not know the distribution of…
A fundamental challenge in the design of nonconvex markets is the absence of existence guarantees for Walrasian equilibria. Despite this lack of guarantees, we observed that the European day-ahead electricity auction attained equilibrium on…
In this work, we provide empirical evidence on organized criminal groups' (OCGs) behavior across the Liverpool area in the U.K. (Merseyside). We find that violent crimes concerning OCGs concentrate in the areas yielding the highest revenue,…