理论经济学

We introduce and analyze a novel family of power indices tailored for sharing networks in technological markets, where firms operate competitively within, but not across, distinct industrial sectors. In these settings, inter-firm…

In social learning environments, agents acquire information from both private signals and the observed actions of predecessors, referred to as history. We define the value of history as the gain in expected payoff from accessing both the…

We consider a repeated game in which players, considered as nodes of a network, are connected. Each player observes her neighbors' moves only. Thus, monitoring is private and imperfect. Players can communicate with their neighbors at each…

We prove that Ranked Pairs orders candidates in such a way as to minimize the $p$-norm, in the limit as $p \to \infty$, of those head-to-head margins of victory which go against its ordering.

We consider a set $E$ of $m$ indivisible goods and a set $N$ consisting of $n \geq 2$ agents. The paper shows that if two agents have \textit{arbitrary} set monotonic valuation functions and the remaining agents have size monotonic…

We study the classical assignment problem with initial endowments in a probabilistic framework. In this setting, each agent initially owns an object and has strict preferences over the entire set of objects, and the goal is to reassign…

We study the problem of allocating homogeneous and indivisible objects among agents with money. In particular, we investigate the relationship between egalitarian-equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler, 1978), as a fairness concept, and…

This paper fundamentally reformulates economic and financial theory to include electronic currencies. The valuation of the electronic currencies will be based on macroeconomic theory and the fundamental equation of monetary policy, not the…

We investigate Gale's important paper published in 1960. This paper contains an example of a candidate of the demand function that satisfies the weak axiom of revealed preference and that is doubtful that it is a demand function of some…

This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one individual. The matching market contains some couples who view the pair of jobs as complements. First, we show by means of an example that a…

We study many-to-one matching problems between institutions and individuals, where each institution may be matched to multiple individuals. The matching market includes couples, who view pairs of institutions as complementary. Institutions'…

Which level of voting costs is optimal in a democracy? This paper argues that intermediate voting costs - what we term a "Midcost democracy" - should be avoided, as they fail to ensure that electoral outcomes reflect the preferences of the…

Historical trends suggest the decline in importance of land as a production factor but its continued importance as a store of value. Using an overlapping generations model with land and aggregate uncertainty, we theoretically study the…

We study a game between $N$ job applicants who incur a cost $c$ (relative to the job value) to reveal their type during interviews and an administrator who seeks to maximize the probability of hiring the best. We define a full learning…

This paper undertakes an analysis of deforestation in the Amazon area using a pathways-based approach to sustainability. We ground the analysis primarily in the sustainability transitions literature but also draw a bridge with…

We introduce a novel perspective by linking ordered probabilistic choice to copula theory, a mathematical framework for modeling dependencies in multivariate distributions. Each representation of ordered probabilistic choice behavior can be…

Consider a population of heterogenous agents whose choice behaviors are partially \textit{comparable} according to a given \textit{primitive ordering}.The set of choice functions admissible in the population specifies a \textit{choice…

This paper explores a novel extension of dynamic matching theory by analyzing a three-way matching problem involving agents from three distinct populations, each with two possible types. Unlike traditional static or two-way dynamic models,…

We study $k$-price auctions in a complete information environment and characterize all pure-strategy Nash equilibrium outcomes. In a setting with $n$ agents having ordered valuations, we show that any agent, except those with the lowest…

We compare two procedures for the iterated removal of strictly dominated strategies. In the nested procedure, a strategy of a player is removed only if it is dominated by an unremoved strategy. The universal procedure is more comprehensive…