计算机科学与博弈论

Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) run protocol governance by letting token holders vote on proposals. The dominant rule, voting power proportional to wallet balance, concentrates control among a small number of large holders,…

By specifying behaviour across multiple agents, social norms are a coordination approach to resolving social dilemmas. Decentralized and wide adoption can be achieved by norms whose prescription involves interpreting stochastic signals in…

We examine fixed-price mechanisms in bilateral trade through the lens of regret minimization. Our main results are twofold. (i) For independent values, a near-optimal $\widetilde{\Theta}(T^{2/3})$ tight bound for $\textsf{Global Budget…

Lotteries are a prevalent form of gambling between a seller and buyers. Designing a lottery requires a model of how buyers make decisions when confronted with uncertain outcomes. Cumulative prospect theory (CPT) is a descriptive model that…

Man-made and natural disruptions such as planned constructions on roads, suspensions of bridges, and blocked roads by trees/mudslides/floods can often create obstacles that separate two connected regions. As a result, the traveling and…

We introduce a class of cooperative games induced by weighted directed graphs. Specifically, the coalitional value combines an internal interaction term given by the induced subgraph game with an external component based on minimal incoming…

Correlated equilibria are a fundamental solution concept in game theory. However, despite decades of research, the complexity beyond games of polynomial type -- such as extensive-form games, congestion or routing games, and more broadly…

Autonomous pricing agents are widely deployed in online marketplaces, making algorithmic pricing a prominent application of multi-agent learning. Experimental studies often report collusive outcomes, but these findings typically rely on…

A diffusion auction refers to a selling process conducted over a social network, where each participant submits a bid and may invite other potential buyers to join the auction. Although various mechanisms have been proposed, none of them…

This paper studies Social Law Synthesis (SLS) in strategic multi-agent environments as a new multi-unit mechanism design problem. We model SLS as a Bayesian single-parameter procurement auction based on Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL)…

Motivated by applications where a system must remain operational via continual procurement of contracts, we study two online contract selection problems under uncertain prices. At each time step, a price drawn from a known distribution is…

An $\alpha$-potential game is a multi-player non-cooperative interaction in which a global potential function approximates individual player rewards up to a structural bias $\alpha$. While identifying a Nash Equilibrium (NE) in generic…

Motivated by the rapid push to decentralize sharing of data, we study whether large-scale data sharing coalitions can form in a decentralized manner under differential privacy when players have heterogeneous privacy preferences. We first…

We study methods to enhance statistical privacy in blockchain transactions. We analyze economic mechanisms for privacy-aware transaction owners whose utility depends not only on the outcome of the mechanism but also negatively on the…

Problem definition: We study a data-driven pricing problem in which a seller sets a price for a single item based on demand observed at a limited number of historical prices. Our goal is to quantify the value of such information and to…

We study a wireless jamming problem consisting of the competition between a legitimate receiver and a jammer, as a zero-sum game where the value to maximize/minimize is the channel capacity at the receiver's side. Most of the approaches…

We study whether simple algorithmic pricing systems can systematically produce collusive-like prices in multi-firm markets. We consider firms using an explore-then-exploit pipeline: they randomize prices during an initial exploration phase,…

We present a new strategic voting model where we use uncertainty representation to model preferences. Specifically, we use probability sets as uncertainty representations, together with lower and upper expected utility gains to take…

Many games of interest in the real world are often intractably large, thereby necessitating the use of game abstraction to shrink them in size, typically by many magnitudes. Over the last two decades, there have been significant advances in…

We study a repeated information design setting in which the receiver, who is also the decision-maker, updates beliefs in a systematically biased way. More specifically, a distorted posterior in our model can be written as a convex…