计算机科学与博弈论

We study a sequential decision-making model where a set of items is repeatedly matched to the same set of agents over multiple rounds. The objective is to determine a sequence of matchings that either maximizes the utility of the least…

We study a fundamental fair allocation problem, where the agent's value is determined by the number of bins either used to pack or cover the items allocated to them. Fairness is evaluated using the maximin share (MMS) criterion. This…

Game theory has traditionally had a relatively limited view of risk based on how a player's expected reward is impacted by the uncertainty of the actions of other players. Recently, a new game-theoretic approach provides a more holistic…

In this paper, we investigate the multiplayer General Lotto game across multiple battlefields, a significant variant of the Colonel Blotto game. In this version, each player employs a probability distribution for resource allocation,…

Incomplete cooperative games generalise the classical model of cooperative games by omitting the values of some of the coalitions. This allows to incorporate uncertainty into the model and study the underlying games as well as possible…

In repeated games, players choose actions concurrently at each step. We consider a parameterized setting of repeated games in which the players form a population of an arbitrary size. Their utility functions encode a reachability objective.…

We study decision-making with rational inattention in settings where agents have perception constraints. In such settings, inaccurate prior beliefs or models of others may lead to inattention blindness, where an agent is unaware of its…

In approval-based budget division, a budget needs to be distributed to candidates based on the voters' approval ballots over these candidates. In the pursuit of a simple, consistent, and approximately fair rule for this setting, we…

This paper presents a model of multi-group Bayesian games (MBGs) to describe the group behavior in Bayesian games, and gives methods to find (strongly) multi-group Bayesian Nash equilibria (MBNE) of this model with a proposed…

This paper proposes a novel algorithm to approximate the core of transferable utility (TU) cooperative games via linear programming. Given the computational hardness of determining the full core, our approach provides a tractable…

We study fair division problems with strategic agents capable of gaining advantages by manipulating their reported preferences. Although several impossibility results have revealed the incompatibility of truthfulness with standard fairness…

In Bayesian persuasion, an informed sender, who observes a state, commits to a randomized signaling scheme that guides a self-interested receiver's actions. Classical models assume the receiver knows the commitment. We, instead, study the…

Vehicular Cloud Computing (VCC) leverages the idle computing capacity of vehicles to execute end-users' offloaded tasks without requiring new computation infrastructure. Despite its conceptual appeal, VCC adoption is hindered by the lack of…

We characterize the optimal reward functions (scoring rules) that incentivize an agent to acquire information and report it truthfully to the principal. The optimal scoring rules let the agent make a simple binary bet in single-dimensional…

Studying the impact of cooperation in strategic settings is one of the cornerstones of algorithmic game theory. Intuitively, allowing more cooperation yields equilibria that are more beneficial for the society of agents. However, for many…

Modelling passenger assignments in public transport networks is a fundamental task for city planners, especially when deliberating network infrastructure decisions. A key aspect of a realistic model is to integrate passengers' selfish…

Auctions are key for maximizing sellers' revenue and ensuring truthful bidding among buyers. Recently, an approach known as differentiable economics based on machine learning (ML) has shown promise in learning powerful auction mechanisms…

There has been significant recent progress in algorithms for approximation of Nash equilibrium in large two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games and exact computation of Nash equilibrium in multiplayer strategic-form games. While…

Block production on the Ethereum blockchain has adopted an auction-based mechanism known as Proposer--Builder Separation (PBS), where validators outsource block creation to builders competing in MEV--Boost auctions for Maximal Extractable…

Information designers, such as online platforms, often do not know the beliefs of their receivers. We design learning algorithms so that the information designer can learn the receivers' prior belief from their actions through repeated…