计算机科学与博弈论

Apportionment is the task of assigning resources to entities with different entitlements in a fair manner, and specifically a manner that is as proportional as possible. The best-known application is the assignment of parliamentary seats to…

Online auction is a cornerstone of e-commerce, and a key challenge is designing incentive-compatible mechanisms that maximize expected revenue. Existing approaches often assume known bidder value distributions and fixed sets of bidders and…

We consider a zero-sum inspection game, in which a defender positions detectors across a critical system to detect multiple attacks caused by an attacker. We assume that detection is imperfect, and each detector location is associated with…

Managing millions of digital auctions is an essential task for modern advertising auction systems. The main approach to managing digital auctions is an autobidding approach, which depends on the Click-Through Rate and Conversion Rate…

Sequential auctions for identical items with unit-demand, private-value buyers are common and often occur periodically without end, as new bidders replace departing ones. We model bidder uncertainty by introducing a probability that a…

We investigate how a blockchain can distill the collective belief of its nodes regarding the trustworthiness of a (sub)set of nodes into a {\em reputation system} that reflects the probability of correctly performing a task. To address this…

We consider finite-state Markov decision processes with the combined Energy-MeanPayoff objective. The controller tries to avoid running out of energy while simultaneously attaining a strictly positive mean payoff in a second dimension. We…

We study a two-sided online data ecosystem comprised of an online platform, users on the platform, and downstream learners or data buyers. The learners can buy user data on the platform (to run a statistic or machine learning task).…

This paper argues that the finite horizon paradox, where game theory contradicts intuition, stems from the limitations of standard number systems in modelling the cognitive perception of infinity. To address this issue, we propose a new…

Suppose that $n$ computer devices are to be connected to a network via inhomogeneous Bernoulli trials. The Shapley value of a device quantifies how much the network's value increases due to the participation of that device. Characteristic…

In this paper, we study advanced persistent threats (APT) with an insider who has different preferences. To address the uncertainty of the insider's preference, we propose the BG-FlipIn: a Bayesian game framework for FlipIt-insider models…

We examine the problem of efficiently learning coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) in polyhedral games, that is, normal-form games with an exponentially large number of actions per player and an underlying combinatorial structure. Prominent…

We study the fair allocation of indivisible chores among agents with asymmetric weights. Among the various fairness notions, weighted maximin share (WMMS) stands out as particularly compelling. However, whether WMMS admits a constant-factor…

We revisit the setting of fair allocation of indivisible items among agents with heterogeneous, non-monotone valuations. We explore the existence and efficient computation of allocations that approximately satisfy either envy-freeness or…

In many two-sided labor markets, interviews are conducted before matches are formed. The growing number of interviews in medical residency markets has increased demand for signaling mechanisms, where applicants send a limited number of…

Myerson's seminal characterization of the revenue-optimal auction for a single item \cite{myerson1981optimal} remains a cornerstone of mechanism design. However, generalizing this framework to multi-item settings has proven exceptionally…

We consider the matching problem in the metric distortion framework. There are $n$ agents and $n$ items occupying points in a shared metric space, and the goal is to design a matching mechanism that outputs a low-cost matching between the…

We study the classical rent division problem, where $n$ agents must allocate $n$ indivisible rooms and split a fixed total rent $R$. The goal is to compute an envy-free (EF) allocation, where no agent prefers another agent's room and rent…

We present a simple local search algorithm for computing EFX (envy-free up to any good) allocations of $m$ indivisible goods among $n$ agents with additive valuations. EFX is a compelling fairness notion, and whether such allocations always…

We consider the problem of the existence of an envy-free allocation up to any good (EFX) for linear valuations and establish new results by connecting this problem to a fixed point framework. Specifically, we first use randomized rounding…