计算机科学与博弈论

One aspect of the algorithmic lens in theoretical computer science is a view on other scientific disciplines that focuses on satisfactory solutions that adhere to real-world constraints, as opposed to solutions that would be optimal…

We study data corruption robustness in offline two-player zero-sum Markov games. Given a dataset of realized trajectories of two players, an adversary is allowed to modify an $\epsilon$-fraction of it. The learner's goal is to identify an…

The secondary market for Ethereum non-fungible tokens (NFTs) has resulted in over $1.8bn being paid to creators in the form of a sales tax commonly called creator royalties. This was despite royalty payments being enforced by no more than…

In this paper we define a new auction, called the Draw auction. It is based on the implementation of a draw when a minimum price of sale is not reached. We find that a Bayesian Nash equilibrium is reached in the Draw auction when each…

A Search and Rescue game (SR game) is a new type of game on a graph that has quickly found applications in scheduling, object detection, and adaptive search. In this paper, we broaden the definition of SR games by putting them into the…

For decades, Simultaneous Ascending Auction (SAA) has been the most popular mechanism used for spectrum auctions. It has recently been employed by many countries for the allocation of 5G licences. Although SAA presents relatively simple…

Extracting from shared resources requires making choices to balance personal profit and sustainability. We present the results of a behavioural experiment wherein we manipulate the default extraction from a finite resource. Participants…

One method to offer some bidders a discount in a first-price auction is to augment their bids when selecting a winner but only charge them their original bids should they win. Another method is to use their original bids to select a winner,…

While many theoretical studies have revealed the strategies that could lead to and maintain cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, less is known about what human participants actually do in this game and how strategies change when…

With the rapid advancement of UAV technology, the problem of UAV coalition formation has become a hotspot. Therefore, designing task-driven multi-UAV coalition formation mechanism has become a challenging problem. However, existing…

Stable matching is a fundamental problem studied both in economics and computer science. The task is to find a matching between two sides of agents that have preferences over who they want to be matched with. A matching is stable if no pair…

In this article we show that the asymptotic outcomes of both shallow and deep neural networks such as those used in BloombergGPT to generate economic time series are exactly the Nash equilibria of a non-potential game. We then design and…

The Bayesian online selection problem aims to design a pricing scheme for a sequence of arriving buyers that maximizes the expected social welfare (or revenue) subject to different structural constraints. Inspired by applications with a…

In this paper, we introduce the first algorithmic framework for Blackwell approachability on the sequence-form polytope, the class of convex polytopes capturing the strategies of players in extensive-form games (EFGs). This leads to a new…

A fundamental component in the theoretical school choice literature is the problem a student faces in deciding which schools to apply to. Recent models have considered a set of schools of different selectiveness and a student who is unsure…

Effective action abstraction is crucial in tackling challenges associated with large action spaces in Imperfect Information Extensive-Form Games (IIEFGs). However, due to the vast state space and computational complexity in IIEFGs, existing…

In the standard model of fair allocation of resources to agents, every agent has some utility for every resource, and the goal is to assign resources to agents so that the agents' welfare is maximized. Motivated by job scheduling, interest…

When users access shared resources in a selfish manner, the resulting societal cost and perceived users' cost is often higher than what would result from a centrally coordinated optimal allocation. While several contributions in mechanism…

We study Stackelberg equilibria in finitely repeated games, where the leader commits to a strategy that picks actions in each round and can be adaptive to the history of play (i.e. they commit to an algorithm). In particular, we study…

The competition complexity of an auction setting is the number of additional bidders needed such that the simple mechanism of selling items separately (with additional bidders) achieves greater revenue than the optimal but complex…