计算机科学与博弈论

Game-theoretic interactions with AI agents could differ from traditional human-human interactions in various ways. One such difference is that it may be possible to simulate an AI agent (for example because its source code is known), which…

We consider a two-player dynamic information design problem between a principal and a receiver -- a game is played between the two agents on top of a Markovian system controlled by the receiver's actions, where the principal obtains and…

Algorithms with predictions have attracted much attention in the last years across various domains, including variants of facility location, as a way to surpass traditional worst-case analyses. We study the $k$-facility location mechanism…

In this paper, a novel cyber-insurance model design is proposed based on system risk evaluation with smart technology applications. The cyber insurance policy for power systems is tailored via cyber risk modeling, reliability impact…

International trade can be a profitable business for agri-food communities. However, access to international markets can be costly and thus unattainable for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). This problem is exacerbated under trade…

In this note, we investigate the robustness of Nash equilibria (NE) in multi-player aggregative games with coupling constraints. There are many algorithms for computing an NE of an aggregative game given a known aggregator. When the…

The Ethereum block-building process has changed significantly since the emergence of Proposer-Builder Separation. Validators access blocks through a marketplace, where block builders bid for the right to construct the block and earn MEV…

A recent paper by Farina & Pipis (2023) established the existence of uncoupled no-linear-swap regret dynamics with polynomial-time iterations in extensive-form games. The equilibrium points reached by these dynamics, known as linear…

We present a novel method to compute $\textit{assume-guarantee contracts}$ in non-zerosum two-player games over finite graphs where each player has a different $ \omega $-regular winning condition. Given a game graph $G$ and two parity…

We consider the behavior of the price of anarchy and equilibrium flows in nonatomic multi-commodity routing games as a function of the traffic demand. We analyze their smoothness with a special attention to specific values of the demand at…

This paper takes a game theoretic approach to the design and analysis of online algorithms and illustrates the approach on the finite-horizon ski-rental problem. This approach allows beyond worst-case analysis of online algorithms. First,…

Mobile edge computing (MEC) paves the way to alleviate the burden of energy and computation of mobile users (MUs) by offloading tasks to the network edge. To enhance the MEC server utilization by optimizing its resource allocation, a…

As the most critical production factor in the era of the digital economy, data will have a significant impact on social production and development. Energy enterprises possess data that is interconnected with multiple industries,…

We review the literature on models that try to explain human behavior in social interactions described by normal-form games with monetary payoffs. We start by covering social and moral preferences. We then focus on the growing body of…

Pricing is an important issue in mobile edge computing. How to appropriately determine the bid of end user (EU) is an incentive factor for edge cloud (EC) to offer service. In this letter, we propose an equilibrium pricing scheme based on…

In uniform-price markets, suppliers compete to supply a resource to consumers, resulting in a single market price determined by their competition. For sufficient flexibility, producers and consumers prefer to commit to a function as their…

Recently, strategic games inspired by Schelling's influential model of residential segregation have been studied in the TCS and AI literature. In these games, agents of k different types occupy the nodes of a network topology aiming to…

Strategic information disclosure, in its simplest form, considers a game between an information provider (sender) who has access to some private information that an information receiver is interested in. While the receiver takes an action…

A growing body of work in economics and computation focuses on the trade-off between implementability and simplicity in mechanism design. The goal is to develop a theory that not only allows to design an incentive structure easy to grasp…

This paper studies a joint design problem where a seller can design both the signal structures for the agents to learn their values, and the allocation and payment rules for selling the item. In his seminal work, Myerson (1981) shows how to…