计算机科学与博弈论
A central challenge in using price signals to coordinate the electricity consumption of a group of users is the operator's lack of knowledge of the users due to privacy concerns. In this paper, we develop a two-time-scale incentive…
We consider the problem of maximizing the gains from trade (GFT) in two-sided markets. The seminal impossibility result by Myerson and Satterthwaite shows that even for bilateral trade, there is no individually rational (IR), Bayesian…
We study the collective schedules problem, which consists in computing a one machine schedule of a set of tasks, knowing that a set of individuals (also called voters) have preferences regarding the order of the execution of the tasks. Our…
The aim of this paper is to introduce models and algorithms for the Participatory Budgeting problem when projects can interact with each other. In this problem, the objective is to select a set of projects that fits in a given budget.…
The application of game theory in cybersecurity enables strategic analysis, adversarial modeling, and optimal decision-making to address security threats' complex and dynamic nature. Previous studies by Abraham et al. and Bi\c{c}er et al.…
The increasing prevalence of multi-agent learning systems in society necessitates understanding how to learn effective and safe policies in general-sum multi-agent environments against a variety of opponents, including self-play.…
We study the design of iterative combinatorial auctions (ICAs). The main challenge in this domain is that the bundle space grows exponentially in the number of items. To address this, several papers have recently proposed machine learning…
The collective schedules problem consists in computing a schedule of tasks shared between individuals. Tasks may have different duration, and individuals have preferences over the order of the shared tasks. This problem has numerous…
Weakly acyclic games generalize potential games and are fundamental to the study of game theoretic control. In this paper, we present a generalization of weakly acyclic games, and we observe its importance in multi-agent learning when…
Colonel Blotto games with discrete strategy spaces effectively illustrate the intricate nature of multidimensional strategic reasoning. This paper studies the equilibrium set of such games where, in line with prior experimental work, the…
We study a family of distance functions on rankings that allow for asymmetric treatments of alternatives and consider the distinct relevance of the top and bottom positions for ordered lists. We provide a full axiomatic characterization of…
Aiming to overcome some of the limitations of worst-case analysis, the recently proposed framework of "algorithms with predictions" allows algorithms to be augmented with a (possibly erroneous) machine-learned prediction that they can use…
In multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), independent learners are those that do not observe the actions of other agents in the system. Due to the decentralization of information, it is challenging to design independent learners that…
We propose an algorithm for computing Nash equilibria (NE) in a class of conflicts with multiple battlefields with uniform battlefield values and a non-linear aggregation function. By expanding the symmetrization idea of Hart [9], proposed…
Multi-agent learning algorithms have been shown to display complex, unstable behaviours in a wide array of games. In fact, previous works indicate that convergent behaviours are less likely to occur as the total number of agents increases.…
Mirror play (MP) is a well-accepted primal-dual multi-agent learning algorithm where all agents simultaneously implement mirror descent in a distributed fashion. The advantage of MP over vanilla gradient play lies in its usage of mirror…
Bringing fairness to energy resource allocation remains a challenge, due to the complexity of system structures and economic interdependencies among users and system operators' decision-making. The rise of distributed energy resources has…
We consider the computation of a Nash equilibrium in attack and defense games on networks (Bloch et al. [1]). We prove that a Nash Equilibrium of the game can be computed in polynomial time with respect to the number of nodes in the…
We study the budget aggregation problem in which a set of strategic voters must split a finite divisible resource (such as money or time) among a set of competing projects. Our goal is twofold: We seek truthful mechanisms that provide…
Solving Nash equilibrium is the key challenge in normal-form games with large strategy spaces, where open-ended learning frameworks offer an efficient approach. In this work, we propose an innovative unified open-ended learning framework…