计算机科学与博弈论

We focus on the problem of placing two facilities along a linear space to serve a group of agents. Each agent is committed to minimizing the distance between her location and the closest facility. A mechanism is an algorithm that maps the…

We study online selection problems in both the prophet and secretary settings, when arriving agents have interdependent values. In the interdependent values model, introduced in the seminal work of Milgrom and Weber [1982], each agent has a…

We introduce General Lotto games with Scouts: a General Lotto game with asymmetric information. There are two players, Red and Blue, who both allocate resources to a field. However, scouting capabilities afford Blue to gain information,…

One cannot make truly fair decisions using integer linear programs unless one controls the selection probabilities of the (possibly many) optimal solutions. For this purpose, we propose a unified framework when binary decision variables…

We consider generalized Nash equilibrium problems (GNEPs) with non-convex strategy spaces and non-convex cost functions. This general class of games includes the important case of games with mixed-integer variables for which only a few…

The allocation of computing tasks for networked distributed services poses a question to service providers on whether centralized allocation management be worth its cost. Existing analytical models were conceived for users accessing…

Conventional distributed approaches to coverage control may suffer from lack of convergence and poor performance, due to the fact that agents have limited information, especially in non-convex discrete environments. To address this issue,…

This paper investigates heterogeneous-cost task allocation with budget constraints (HCTAB), wherein heterogeneity is manifested through the varying capabilities and costs associated with different agents for task execution. Different from…

It is a common practice in the current literature of electricity markets to use game-theoretic approaches for strategic price bidding. However, they generally rely on the assumption that the strategic bidders have prior knowledge of rival…

In competitive multi-player interactions, simultaneous optimality is a key requirement for establishing strategic equilibria. This property is explicit when the game-theoretic equilibrium is the simultaneously optimal solution of coupled…

In zero-sum games, the optimal strategy is well-defined by the Nash equilibrium. However, it is overly conservative when playing against suboptimal opponents and it can not exploit their weaknesses. Limited look-ahead game solving in…

We consider truthful combinatorial auctions with items $M = [m]$ for sale to $n$ bidders, where each bidder $i$ has a private monotone valuation $v_i : 2^M \to R_+$. Among truthful mechanisms, maximal-in-range (MIR) mechanisms achieve the…

Nash equilibrium is a key concept in game theory fundamental for elucidating the equilibrium state of strategic interactions, finding applications in diverse fields such as economics, political science, and biology. However, the Nash…

Gameplay under various forms of uncertainty has been widely studied. Feldman et al. (2010) studied a particularly low-information setting in which one observes the opponent's actions but no payoffs, not even one's own, and introduced an…

Evolutionary anti-coordination games on networks capture real-world strategic situations such as traffic routing and market competition. In such games, agents maximize their utility by choosing actions that differ from their neighbors'…

We study various novel complexity measures for two-sided matching mechanisms, applied to the two canonical strategyproof matching mechanisms, Deferred Acceptance (DA) and Top Trading Cycles (TTC). Our metrics are designed to capture the…

In resource contribution games, a class of non-cooperative games, the players want to obtain a bundle of resources and are endowed with bags of bundles of resources that they can make available into a common for all to enjoy. Available…

Stackelberg routing platforms (SRP) reduce congestion in one-shot traffic networks by proposing optimal route recommendations to selfish travelers. Traditionally, Stackelberg routing is cast as a partial control problem where a fraction of…

Judgment aggregation is a framework to aggregate individual opinions on multiple, logically connected issues into a collective outcome. These opinions are cast by judges, which can be for example referees, experts, advisors or jurors,…

Online gradient descent (OGD) is well known to be doubly optimal under strong convexity or monotonicity assumptions: (1) in the single-agent setting, it achieves an optimal regret of $\Theta(\log T)$ for strongly convex cost functions; and…