计算机科学与博弈论

While Nash equilibrium has emerged as the central game-theoretic solution concept, many important games contain several Nash equilibria and we must determine how to select between them in order to create real strategic agents. Several Nash…

In frequently repeated matching scenarios, individuals may require diversification in their choices. Therefore, when faced with a set of potential outcomes, each individual may have an ideal lottery over outcomes that represents their…

We study multi-buyer multi-item sequential item pricing mechanisms for revenue maximization with the goal of approximating a natural fractional relaxation -- the ex ante optimal revenue. We assume that buyers' values are subadditive but…

No-regret learning has a long history of being closely connected to game theory. Recent works have devised uncoupled no-regret learning dynamics that, when adopted by all the players in normal-form games, converge to various equilibrium…

The application of incentives, such as reward and punishment, is a frequently applied way for promoting cooperation among interacting individuals in structured populations. However, how to properly use the incentives is still a challenging…

We consider a voting problem in which a set of agents have metric preferences over a set of alternatives, and are also partitioned into disjoint groups. Given information about the preferences of the agents and their groups, our goal is to…

In the recently introduced topological distance games, strategic agents need to be assigned to a subset of vertices of a topology. In the assignment, the utility of an agent depends on both the agent's inherent utilities for other agents…

In this paper, we investigate the Mechanism Design aspects of the $m$-Capacitated Facility Location Problem ($m$-CFLP) on a line. We focus on two frameworks. In the first framework, the number of facilities is arbitrary, all facilities have…

We study information design in click-through auctions, in which the bidders/advertisers bid for winning an opportunity to show their ads but only pay for realized clicks. The payment may or may not happen, and its probability is called the…

Transaction fee mechanism design is a new decentralized mechanism design problem where users bid for space on the blockchain. Several recent works showed that the transaction fee mechanism design fundamentally departs from classical…

We study automated intrusion response and formulate the interaction between an attacker and a defender as an optimal stopping game where attack and defense strategies evolve through reinforcement learning and self-play. The game-theoretic…

In the classical prophet inequality settings, a gambler is given a sequence of $n$ random variables $X_1, \dots, X_n$, taken from known distributions, observes their values in this (potentially adversarial) order, and select one of them,…

We study the efficiency of non-truthful auctions for auto-bidders with both return on spend (ROS) and budget constraints. The efficiency of a mechanism is measured by the price of anarchy (PoA), which is the worst case ratio between the…

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items under the criteria of the maximin share guarantee. Specifically, we study approximation of maximin share allocations under hereditary set system valuations, in which…

Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) is used in elections for many political offices around the world. It allows voters to specify their preferences among candidates as a ranking. We identify a generalization of the rule, called Approval-IRV, that…

Gig economy consists of two market groups connected via an intermediary. Popular examples are rideshares where passengers and drivers are mediated via platforms such as Uber and Lyft. In a duopoly market, the platforms must compete to…

We study price-discrimination games between buyers and a seller where privacy arises endogenously--that is, utility maximization yields equilibrium strategies where privacy occurs naturally. In this game, buyers with a high valuation for a…

We consider a variant of continuous-state partially-observable stochastic games with neural perception mechanisms and an asymmetric information structure. One agent has partial information, with the observation function implemented as a…

We study the bilateral trade problem where a seller owns a single indivisible item, and a potential buyer seeks to purchase it. Previous mechanisms for this problem only considered the case where the values of the buyer and the seller are…

Algorithms based on combinatorial auctions show significant potential regarding their application for channel assignment problems in multi-connectivity ultra-reliable wireless networks. However the computational effort required by such…