Defaults: a double-edged sword in governing common resources
Abstract
Extracting from shared resources requires making choices to balance personal profit and sustainability. We present the results of a behavioural experiment wherein we manipulate the default extraction from a finite resource. Participants were exposed to two treatments -- pro-social or self-serving extraction defaults -- and a control without defaults. We examined the persistence of these nudges by removing the default after five rounds. Results reveal that a self-serving default increased the average extraction while present, whereas a pro-social default only decreased extraction for the first two rounds. Notably, the influence of defaults depended on individual inclinations, with cooperative individuals extracting more under a self-serving default, and selfish individuals less under a pro-social default. After the removal of the default, we observed no significant differences with the control treatment. Our research highlights the potential of defaults as cost-effective tools for promoting sustainability, while also advocating for a careful use to avoid adverse effects.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2403.06796,
title = {Defaults: a double-edged sword in governing common resources},
author = {Eladio Montero-Porras and Rémi Suchon and Tom Lenaerts and Elias Fernández Domingos},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2403.06796},
year = {2024}
}
Comments
36 pages, 11 pages of Supplementary Information, 11 figures