相关论文: Goedel's Incompleteness Theorems hold vacuously

If we apply an extension of the Deduction meta-Theorem to Goedel's meta-reasoning of "undecidability", we can conclude that Goedel's formal system of Arithmetic is not omega-consistent. If we then take the standard interpretation…

Standard expositions of Goedel's 1931 paper on undecidable arithmetical propositions are based on two presumptions in Goedel's 1931 interpretation of his own, formal, reasoning - one each in Theorem VI and in Theorem XI - which do not meet…

Standard interpretations of Goedel's "undecidable" proposition, [(Ax)R(x)], argue that, although [~(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable if [(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable, we may not conclude from this that [~(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable. We show that such…

We argue that Godel's completeness theorem is equivalent to completability of consistent theories, and Godel's incompleteness theorem is equivalent to the fact that this completion is not constructive, in the sense that there are some…

We first partly develop a mathematical notion of stable consistency intended to reflect the actual consistency property of human beings. Then we give a generalization of the first and second G\"odel incompleteness theorem to stably…

We give a proof of the inconsistency of PM arithmetic, classical set theory and related systems, incidentally exposing an error in Goedel's own proof of Goedel's Theorems. The inconsistency proof, that formulae of the form R and ~R occur as…

Goedel's results have had a great impact in diverse fields such as philosophy, computer sciences and fundamentals of mathematics. The fact that the rule of mathematical induction is contradictory with the rest of clauses used by Goedel to…

Godelian sentences of a sufficiently strong and recursively enumerable theory, constructed in Godel's 1931 groundbreaking paper on the incompleteness theorems, are unprovable if the theory is consistent; however, they could be refutable.…

In this paper, we argue that formal systems of first order Arithmetic that admit Goedelian undecidable propositions validly are abnormally non-constructive. We argue that, in such systems, the strong representation of primitive recursive…

G\"odel's second incompleteness theorem is standardly understood as showing that no sufficiently strong, consistent theory of arithmetic can prove its own consistency, a result typically interpreted against a model-theoretic background in…

Goedel's explicit thesis was that his undecidable formula GUS is a well-formed, well-defined formal sentence in any formalisation of Intuitive Arithmetic IA in which the axioms and rules of inference are recursively definable. His implicit…

I review the classical conclusions drawn from Goedel's meta-reasoning establishing an undecidable proposition GUS in standard PA. I argue that, for any given set of numerical values of its free variables, every recursive arithmetical…

Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem is generalized to definable theories, which are not necessarily recursively enumerable, by using a couple of syntactic-semantic notions, one is the consistency of a theory with the set of all true…

Classical interpretations of Goedel's formal reasoning imply that the truth of some arithmetical propositions of any formal mathematical language, under any interpretation, is essentially unverifiable. However, a language of general,…

The prevalent interpretation of G\"odel's Second Theorem states that a sufficiently adequate and consistent theory does not prove its consistency. It is however not entirely clear how to justify this informal reading, as the formulation of…

A new computational method that uses polynomial equations and dynamical systems to evaluate logical propositions is introduced and applied to Goedel's incompleteness theorems. The truth value of a logical formula subject to a set of axioms…

The famous G\"odel incompleteness theorem says that for every sufficiently rich formal theory (containing formal arithmetic in some natural sense) there exist true unprovable statements. Such statements would be natural candidates for being…

G\"odel's argument for the First Incompleteness Theorem is, structurally, a proof by contradiction. This article intends to reframe the argument by, first, isolating an additional assumption the argument relies on, and then, second, arguing…

We offer a mathematical proof of consistency for Peano Arithmetic PA formalizable in PA. This result is compatible with Goedel's Second Incompleteness Theorem since our consistency proof does not rely on the representation of consistency as…

We prove, for stably computably enumerable formal systems, direct analogues of the first and second incompleteness theorems of G\"odel. A typical stably computably enumerable set is the set of Diophantine equations with no integer…