相关论文: Approximately Efficient Cost-Sharing Mechanisms

Consider the many shared resource scheduling problem where jobs have to be scheduled on identical parallel machines with the goal of minimizing the makespan. However, each job needs exactly one additional shared resource in order to be…

Participatory budgeting (PB) has been widely adopted and has attracted significant research efforts; however, there is a lack of mechanisms for PB which elicit project interactions, such as substitution and complementarity, from voters.…

We study bilateral trade between two strategic agents. The celebrated result of Myerson and Satterthwaite states that in general, no incentive-compatible, individually rational and weakly budget balanced mechanism can be efficient. I.e., no…

This thesis is concerned with the design of distributed algorithms for solving optimization problems. We consider networks where each node has exclusive access to a cost function, and design algorithms that make all nodes cooperate to find…

Imitation is widely observed in populations of decision-making agents. Using our recent convergence results for asynchronous imitation dynamics on networks, we consider how such networks can be efficiently driven to a desired equilibrium…

Coordination mechanisms aim to mitigate the impact of selfishness when scheduling jobs to different machines. Such a mechanism defines a scheduling policy within each machine and naturally induces a game among the selfish job owners. The…

Motivated by the cost savings that can be obtained by sharing resources in a network context, we consider a stylized, yet representative model, for the coordination of maintenance and service logistics for a geographic network of assets.…

We consider a monopolist seller facing a single buyer with additive valuations over n heterogeneous, independent items. It is known that in this important setting optimal mechanisms may require randomization [HR12], use menus of infinite…

Applications such as employees sharing office spaces over a workweek can be modeled as problems where agents are matched to resources over multiple rounds. Agents' requirements limit the set of compatible resources and the rounds in which…

We efficiently solve the optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design problem for independent bidders with arbitrary demand constraints when either the number of bidders is a constant or the number of items is a constant. In the first…

Two general algorithms based on opportunity costs are given for approximating a revenue-maximizing set of bids an auctioneer should accept, in a combinatorial auction in which each bidder offers a price for some subset of the available…

Moss and Rabani[12] study constrained node-weighted Steiner tree problems with two independent weight values associated with each node, namely, cost and prize (or penalty). They give an O(log n)-approximation algorithm for the…

Ridesharing has great potential to improve transportation efficiency while reducing congestion and pollution. To realize this potential, mechanisms are needed that allocate vehicles optimally and provide the right incentives to riders.…

We address the exact resolution of a MINLP model where resources can be activated in order to satisfy a demand (a partitioning constraint) while minimizing total cost. Cost functions are convex latency functions plus a fixed activation…

We present an iterative inverse reinforcement learning algorithm to infer optimal cost functions in continuous spaces. Based on a popular maximum entropy criteria, our approach iteratively finds a weight improvement step and proposes a…

We introduce a novel approach to reduce the computational effort of solving mixed-integer convex chance constrained programs through the scenario approach. Instead of reducing the number of required scenarios, we directly minimize the…

Stable matching is a fundamental area with many practical applications, such as centralised clearinghouses for school choice or job markets. Recent work has introduced the paradigm of near-feasibility in capacitated matching settings, where…

How does one allocate a collection of resources to a set of strategic agents in a fair and efficient manner without using money? For in many scenarios it is not feasible to use money to compensate agents for otherwise unsatisfactory…

We consider the problem of a revenue-maximizing seller with m items for sale to n additive bidders with hard budget constraints, assuming that the seller has some prior distribution over bidder values and budgets. The prior may be…

We study the problem of aggregating distributions, such as budget proposals, into a collective distribution. An ideal aggregation mechanism would be Pareto efficient, strategyproof, and fair. Most previous work assumes that agents evaluate…