相关论文: Order Independence and Rationalizability

Iterated admissibility is a well-known and important concept in classical game theory, e.g. to determine rational behaviors in multi-player matrix games. As recently shown by Berwanger, this concept can be soundly extended to infinite games…

We considered a three-strategy game with the characteristics of the prisoner's dilemma and stag hunt games. This game was inspired by recent experimental studies that elucidated the role of individual solutions. People who adopt individual…

We study a simple example of a sequential game illustrating problems connected with making rational decisions that are universal for social sciences. The set of chooser's optimal decisions that manifest his preferences in case of a constant…

We introduce the concept of budget games. Players choose a set of tasks and each task has a certain demand on every resource in the game. Each resource has a budget. If the budget is not enough to satisfy the sum of all demands, it has to…

I prove that it is irrational for agents with even slightly private preferences to condition their strategy on private information that is payoff-irrelevant to them, contrary to powerful techniques for analyzing communication and repeated…

Intention recognition is an important characteristic of intelligent agents. In their interactions with others, they try to read others' intentions and make an image of others to choose their actions accordingly. While the way in which…

The theory of repeated games analyzes the long-term relationship of interacting players and mathematically reveals the condition of how cooperation is achieved, which is not achieved in a one-shot game. In the repeated prisoner's dilemma…

We characterize three interrelated concepts in epistemic game theory: permissibility, proper rationalizability, and iterated admissibility. We define the lexicographic epistemic model for a game with incomplete information. Based on it, we…

Repeated games have provided an explanation how mutual cooperation can be achieved even if defection is more favorable in a one-shot game in prisoner's dilemma situation. Recently found zero-determinant strategies have substantially been…

The iterated prisoner's dilemma is a game that produces many counter-intuitive and complex behaviors in a social environment, based on very simple basic rules. It illustrates that cooperation can be a good thing even in a competitive world,…

Zero-determinant strategies are a class of strategies in repeated games which unilaterally control payoffs. Zero-determinant strategies have attracted much attention in studies of social dilemma, particularly in the context of evolution of…

Large language models can score well on named game-theory benchmarks while failing on the same strategic computation once semantic cues are removed. We show this gap with procedurally generated zero-sum matrix games: a model that recognizes…

We consider a network of coupled agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game, in which players are allowed to pick a strategy in the interval [0,1], with 0 corresponding to defection, 1 to cooperation, and intermediate values representing…

Continuous-time game dynamics are typically first order systems where payoffs determine the growth rate of the players' strategy shares. In this paper, we investigate what happens beyond first order by viewing payoffs as higher order forces…

We study pure coordination games where in every outcome, all players have identical payoffs, 'win' or 'lose'. We identify and discuss a range of 'purely rational principles' guiding the reasoning of rational players in such games and…

Learning models do not in general imply that weakly dominated strategies are irrelevant or justify the related concept of "forward induction," because rational agents may use dominated strategies as experiments to learn how opponents play,…

We investigate uniformity properties of strategies. These properties involve sets of plays in order to express useful constraints on strategies that are not \mu-calculus definable. Typically, we can state that a strategy is…

How do incentive levels affect strategic behaviour? We address this with an experiment that separately identifies own- and opponent-incentive effects in two dominance-solvable games that differ in strategic complexity. Higher own incentives…

Many real-world systems are composed of interdependent networks that rely on one another. Such networks are typically designed and operated by different entities, who aim at maximizing their own payoffs. There exists a game among these…

Escalation is a typical feature of infinite games. Therefore tools conceived for studying infinite mathematical structures, namely those deriving from coinduction are essential. Here we use coinduction, or backward coinduction (to show its…