相关论文: Statistical mechanics of spatial evolutionary game…

We study finite-player dynamic stochastic games with heterogeneous interactions and non-Markovian linear-quadratic objective functionals. We derive the Nash equilibrium explicitly by converting the first-order conditions into a coupled…

We investigate the convergence of symmetric stochastic differential games with interactions via control, where the volatility terms of both idiosyncratic and common noises are controlled. We apply the stochastic maximum principle, following…

Statistical mechanics is based on interplay between energy minimization and entropy maximization. Here we formalize this interplay via axioms of cooperative game theory (Nash bargaining) and apply it out of equilibrium. These axioms capture…

Probabilistic model checking for stochastic games enables formal verification of systems that comprise competing or collaborating entities operating in a stochastic environment. Despite good progress in the area, existing approaches focus…

A stochastic model for behavioral changes by imitative pair interactions of individuals is developed. `Microscopic' assumptions on the specific form of the imitative processes lead to a stochastic version of the game dynamical equations.…

Predicting selfish behavior in public environments by considering Nash equilibria is a central concept of game theory. For the dynamic traffic assignment problem modeled by a flow over time game, in which every particle tries to reach its…

To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…

We consider an $N$-player game where the states of the players evolve with time as Stochastic Differential Equations (SDEs) with interaction only in the drift terms. Each player controls the drift of the SDE satisfied by her state process,…

In this paper we consider non zero-sum games where multiple players control the drift of a process, and their payoffs depend on its ergodic behaviour. We establish their connection with systems of Ergodic BSDEs, and prove the existence of a…

We introduce a novel class of Nash equilibrium seeking dynamics for non-cooperative games with a finite number of players, where the convergence to the Nash equilibrium is bounded by a KL function with a settling time that can be upper…

The stable cooperation ratio of spatial evolutionary games has been widely studied using simulations or approximate analysis methods. However, sometimes such ``stable'' cooperation ratios obtained via approximate methods might not be…

In order to better understand the impact of environmental stochastic fluctuations on the evolution of animal behavior, we introduce the concept of a stochastic Nash equilibrium (SNE) that extends the classical concept of a Nash equilibrium…

We investigate the fluctuations induced by irrationality in simple games with a large number of competing players. We show that Nash equilibria in such games are ``weakly'' stable: irrationality propagates and amplifies through players'…

In this study, we investigate $N$-player stochastic differential games with regime switching, where the player dynamics are modulated by a finite-state Markov chain. We analyze the associated Nash system, which consists of a system of…

We analyze a differential game with spatially distributed controls to study a multiregional transboundary pollution problem. The dynamics of the state variable (pollution stock) is defined by a two dimensional parabolic partial differential…

Game-theoretic techniques and equilibria analysis facilitate the design and verification of competitive systems. While algorithmic complexity of equilibria computation has been extensively studied, practical implementation and application…

We study the problem of stochastic stability for evolutionary dynamics under the logit choice rule. We consider general classes of coordination games, symmetric or asymmetric, with an arbitrary number of strategies, which satisfies the…

Recently, a new model extending the standard replicator equation to a finite set of players connected on an arbitrary graph was developed in evolutionary game dynamics. The players are interpreted as subpopulations of multipopulations…

Static and dynamic equilibria in noisy binary choice (Ising) games on complete and random graphs in the annealed approximation are analysed. Two versions, an Ising game with interaction term defined in accordance with the Ising model in…

We study the quality of outcomes in repeated games when the population of players is dynamically changing and participants use learning algorithms to adapt to the changing environment. Game theory classically considers Nash equilibria of…