相关论文: Evolutionary games and quasispecies

In population games, a large population of players, modeled as a continuum, is divided into subpopulations, and the fitness or payoff of each subpopulation depends on the overall population composition. Evolutionary dynamics describe how…

This is an introductory review of deterministic mutation-selection models for asexual populations (i.e., quasispecies theory) and related topics. First, the basic concepts of fitness, mutations, and sequence space are introduced. Different…

We discuss stochastic dynamics of populations of individuals playing games. Our models possess two evolutionarily stable strategies: an efficient one, where a population is in a state with the maximal payoff (fitness) and a risk-dominant…

Evolutionary game theory is a framework to formalize the evolution of collectives ("populations") of competing agents that are playing a game and, after every round, update their strategies to maximize individual payoffs. There are two…

Frequency dependent selection and demographic fluctuations play important roles in evolutionary and ecological processes. Under frequency dependent selection, the average fitness of the population may increase or decrease based on…

Evolutionary game dynamics describes the spreading of successful strategies in a population of reproducing individuals. Typically, the microscopic definition of strategy spreading is stochastic, such that the dynamics becomes deterministic…

We model evolution according to an asymmetric game as occurring in multiple finite populations, one for each role in the game, and study the effect of subjecting individuals to stochastic strategy mutations. We show that, when these…

Many socio-economic and biological processes can be modeled as systems of interacting individuals. The behaviour of such systems can be often described within game-theoretic models. In these lecture notes, we introduce fundamental concepts…

Frequency-dependent selection reflects the interaction between different species as they battle for limited resources in their environment. In a stochastic evolutionary game the species relative fitnesses guides the evolutionary dynamics…

We revisit the original hawk-dove game with slight modifications to payoff values while maintaining the fundamental principles of interaction. The practical robustness of the theoretical tools of game theory is tested on a simulated…

To our knowledge, the populations are generally assumed to be homogeneous in the traditional approach to evolutionary game dynamics. Here, we focus on the inhomogeneous populations. A simple model which can describe the inhomogeneity of the…

In evolutionary games the fitness of individuals is not constant but depends on the relative abundance of the various strategies in the population. Here we study general games among n strategies in populations of large but finite size. We…

Game theoretic tools are utilized to analyze a one-locus continuous selection model of sex-specific meiotic drive by considering nonequivalence of the viabilities of reciprocal heterozygotes that might be noticed at an imprinted locus. The…

Evolutionary game dynamics with two 2-strategy games in a finite population has been investigated in this study. Traditionally, frequency-dependent evolutionary dynamics are modeled by deterministic replicator dynamics under the assumption…

Consider a mathematical model of evolutionary adaptation of fitness landscape and mutation matrix as a reaction to population changes. As a basis, we use an open quasispecies model, which is modified to include explicit death flow. We…

This paper is concerned with the evolution of haploid organisms that reproduce asexually. In a seminal piece of work, Eigen and coauthors proposed the quasispecies model in an attempt to understand such an evolutionary process. Their work…

We study a continuous time model for the frequency distribution of an infinitely large asexual population in which both beneficial and deleterious mutations occur and the fitness is additive. When beneficial mutations are ignored, the exact…

We study the adaptation dynamics of an initially maladapted population evolving via the elementary processes of mutation and selection. The evolution occurs on rugged fitness landscapes which are defined on the multi-dimensional genotypic…

We adapt a fitness function from evolutionary game theory as a mechanism for aggregation and dispersal in a partial differential equation (PDE) model of two interacting populations, described by density functions $u$ and $v$. We consider a…

Evolutionary game dynamics are often studied in the context of different population structures. Here we propose a new population structure that is inspired by simple multicellular life forms. In our model, cells reproduce but can stay…